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Post-truth and demographics in the "refugee crisis". The thanatopolitical "pleat" in the European Union

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Abstract

Demographic pressure, along with the threat of nationalism and xenophobic populist movements, has become part of the story in which the so-called refugee crisis *is threatening the architecture of the European Union, starting with the Schengen Treaty. This story is considered a "post-truth" construct which conceals the fact that the crisis is the outcome of a migration policy designed to be subordinate to the desire for an ideal unified labour market detached from the reality of real migratory flows. This policy has given increasing berth to security and fear, which has legitimised inaction in the face of the humanitarian tragedy caused by what we call here "thanatopolitics." This article analyses the use of the demographic argument, the role of Schengen in the construction of* Fortress Europe *and the refugee policy, and the emotional mobilisation of public opinion during the crisis based on a selection of the most frequently reproduced images in the summer of 2015.*

Key words: migration policy, refugee, European Union, geopolitics, post-truth.

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1. At the gates of hell: Post-truth and the story of the refugee crisis

In March 2016, Donald Tusk, the president of the Council of Europe, warned: "I want to appeal to all potential illegal economic immigrants: don't come to Europe, don't risk your lives or your money". He concluded with a Dantean, "It is all for nothing". The eviction of illegal settlers in Calais had begun the previous day, around 3,000 people thrown together in deplorable conditions hoping to leap the channel to Great Britain. The encampment was not taken apart until October 2016, four months after Brexit's victory in the referendum on whether or not Great Britain stayed in the European Union (although it was not completely eradicated).

This episode cannot be understood without framing it within the refugee crisis in the summer of 2015 and the European institutions' construction of the canonical story of this event, which has been accepted by not only the media but even the harshest critics of the EU's migration policies. There are four main arguments:

1) "demographic pressure" precipitated the migratory crisis, which is projected to continue in the future and encompasses both "economic immigrants" and "refugees") (Naïr, 2016);

2) the refugee crisis endangers the EU's framework, and the first victim will be the Schengen Treaty, which enshrines freedom of movement for EU citizens (Arango et al., 2016);

3) the rise in xenophobic populism in favour of protectionism since the economic crisis is thwarting a unified migration policy to cope with the crisis, especially in the Eastern European countries; and

4) the solution is to further the European project and reinforce Schengen, as summarised in the slogan "More Europe!". Some translate this into the creation of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (González Enríquez, 2015), although it initially only took shape with the creation of a European Border and Coast Guard Agency (European Commission, 2015). This four-act drama unfolded parallel to an emotional *crescendo*, one good example of which is Tusk's dissuasive message targeted ostensibly at candidates for emigration, although really for European citizens, implicitly denying the former entry into paradise and condemning them to hell, hence the admonitory "Lasciate ogni speranza, voi" ("Abandon all hope, ye who enter). The agents that have contributed to these emotional politics – where fear and compassion jostle with each other – include both the European institutions, in their efforts to create public opinion, and the media and NGOs, in their efforts to raise awareness and censure the humanitarian drama besieging refugees in particular and immigrants in general, often mixed together, who are trying to come to Europe illegally from the Mediterranean border.

We uphold three interrelated hypotheses. The first is that we are now at a critical juncture in the development of EU migration policies, and not because of their absence, as claimed. The second is that the story that demographics has become a global risk which, along with nationalism and xenophobic populist movements, threaten the European architecture – where the EU's responsibilities are centrifuged in the states – may be a "post-truth" construct both in the more classical sense of distancing the institutions (here EU) from a reality replaced with

stories fabricated by idea labs (in this case neoliberals), a thesis upheld back by Hanna Arendt (2018) in the 1960s, and in the use of emotions as a mobilising agent (Lacroix, 2001). And the third is that in practice this story entails what we call the "thanatopolitical 'pleat'" applied to managing migrations: the shift towards death in the binomial "live and let die" which characterises biopolitics (meant since the 18th century as a way of rationalising the problems that emerge from governmental practice of the phenomena inherent to a set of living beings as a population), which from its inception has been associated with liberalism, according to Michel Foucault (1976 & 1978).

On the following pages, we set out to analyse how and why the demographic argument is mobilised; we first examine communications from the European Union and the Global Risk reports sponsored by the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2016), contrasted with the main demographic data published by Eurostat and the scholarly literature, in order to then re-examine the aforementioned crisis within the context of the governability of populations and offer an alternative story to what is known as the "refugee crisis in Europe".

2. "Migratory crisis" and demographic evolution

2.1. *Demographic excesses and the production of redundancy*

"Demographic pressure", morphed into "migratory pressure", has become one of the most common arguments explaining the causes of the migratory crisis in the Mediterranean. Thus, the term "demographic faultline" is used to explain the migrations from the southern to northern Mediterranean, not just of refugees (Naïr, 2013). This story, focused on the surpluses that demographic growth is causing on the continent of African, in contrast to the ageing process in Europe, steers us to the malthusianisation of the debate and consequently its naturalisation. It is understandable that this stance is adopted strategically, since turning demographic growth into a global risk (Domingo, 2015) accentuates the urgency of taking measures, not only temporarily but also for the forthcoming years, while the comparative population dynamic and structural data and the population projections by the United Nations seem to bring objectivity to the problem. Finally, by framing it this way, migration itself can be offered as a solution, making a virtue of necessity; by this we mean that migration can be presented as a way to offset the ageing of the European population and make the pension system sustainable – as proposed by the United Nations with the term "replacement migrations" (UN, 2001), following the maxim by which risks become opportunities.

However, it is important to note that the production of surpluses, or redundancies, is essentially due to the economic system, not to the demographic potential. We use redundant in the way Zygmunt Bauman (2003) defined it: the population comprised of individuals incapable of entering the job market or who, once expelled from it, have no prospects of going back and are not even considered reserves, whose main characteristic would be their status as failed consumers. However, this definition has been expanded upon by different authors, including the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (2015), who used the concept of "naked life" coined by the philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1998) to encompass everyone who remains in a grey area of the law, simultaneously inside and outside it, that is, a life stripped of the attributes of citizenship. This definition allows him to add illegal immigrants and refugees to the redundant population, in addition to prisoners of

war, people who live in conditions of forced labour or forced to work in prostitution, child laborers and those exploited by a regime of semi-slavery. Even though the defenders of the thesis of "the demographic faultline" end up having to mention the productive system's inability to absorb the youths who are reaching working age due to past demographic growth (Naïr, 2016), they forget that economic development also produces expulsions from the job market, and that even with the arrival of empty generations at the active age, they can be expelled, as happened with the youths of Spain after the implementation of the austerity policies since 2012. This thus turns expulsion into an intrinsic mechanism of capitalism, not demographics, which Saskia Sassen (2015) has explained with the development of predatory formations.

It is true that the demographic evolutions in the EU and the majority of African countries are in two very different phases: the former in the post-transitional phase, characterised by low or very low fertility and almost zero or even negative growth, and the latter by a considerable upswing in population, even though a gradual decrease in fertility has begun in many of the countries. The increase is still high due to the potential of an age pyramid concentrated around the reproductive years, with large young cohorts, while the countries lagging the most in the downward turn are only in the initial stage of this demographic transition. These differing dynamics and structures explain why the United Nations' population projections forecast that by 2051 Africa will be the continent experiencing the steepest population growth (115%), above Asia (only 18%), even though the latter will still be the most populous continent, with 5.261 billion inhabitants, almost twice as many as the 2.571 billion Africans estimated for that year. If we compare this evolution with Europe's, the differences are stark: as the African population increases, Europe's will decrease by 3.5%, standing at 714 million. However, this will not be the only difference; the most important one is still structure: 30 years from now the active population will reach 67% in Africa, most of them young adults, while in Europe it will have dropped to 57% of the total, with a full 28% of the population over the age of 65. If we bear in mind the African market's difficulties absorbing this acceleration in the young population, it is logical to think about migration to Europe. Even if the African economy develops, it will continue to expel part of its population.

Still, we have to stress first that the migratory movements resulting from the humanitarian crisis on the Mediterranean frontier with the EU are not solely comprised of African citizens. Instead, they also include the bulk of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to a considerable contingent of Asians – from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh – whom the mafia conduct via Africa. Secondly, economic reasons are still more important in the growth in expulsions than demographics, regardless of whether it is because of the political and economic disintegration of the African regimes or the direct or indirect application of the structural adjustment measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund and backed by the EU, or the intervention of governments and corporations alien to regional interests. Thirdly, we should also recall how during the migratory boom to Spain, the influx of immigrants from Latin America who became illegal once their tourist visas expired far outnumbered the African immigrants. At that time, nobody thought of associating this massive illegality with any kind of "demographic pressure".

2.2.   *The limits on the registration of refugees in the EU*

One of the first difficulties in analysing the "refugee crisis" is precisely the size of the refugee population, which is overestimated in some cases due to duplications and underestimated in others when they have avoided registering. The uncertainty is extreme with regard to the real flows and the deaths by drowning or on the journey across the Sahara. And this does not include the difficulty comparing among the different countries due to their particular legal definitions of asylee or refugee, which have them retain refugee status for longer or shorter periods of time. For example, the increase of refugees in Pakistan is now due more to births than to an increase from new influxes. Proof of this statistical disarray is the news item that appeared in *The Guardian* in late 2016 citing sources from Europol, which estimated the figure of disappeared minor migrants and asylum-seekers at 10,000. Is this a statistical artefact or, as the news item insinuated, is it truly the number of minors who have fallen into the hands of human trafficking mafias working in prostitution and organ sales?

What we do know is that the majority of persons displaced by war are redistributed within the same or in neighbouring countries. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (2016), of the 64 million estimated refugees in the world, Turkey, with more than 2.5 million Syrian refugees alone, is the country that has received the most, followed by Pakistan with 1.6 million (primarily Afghans), the Islamic Republic of Iran with 979,000 (the majority of whom are Afghan as well) and Ethiopia with slightly over 736,000 people (mostly Somalis and South Sudanese). Meantime, the EU-28 recorded 1.09 million people with refugee status on 31 December 2016, 30.5% of them women and 20.7% minors under the age of 14. If we compare the people registered as refugees or asylees in the EU since 2008 and the asylum-seekers throughout this same period (Fig. 1), we can clearly see how requests for asylum skyrocketed in 2015.

Figure 1. Population with refugee status living the EU and monthly applications for asylum in the European Union, 2008-2016

Source: Author. Eurostat [*migr_pop3ctb*] [*migr_asypenctzm*]. Extracted on 5.12.17

Precisely in the month of May, this figure increased 23% from the previous month, and a peak of 172,000 applications for asylum was reached in October, which later fell to 28,485. This was unquestionably impacted by the implementation of the agreement with Turkey, as we shall discuss below. And even though it is true that there was a significant increase in the proportion of applications in Italy dovetailing with the implementation of the treaty with Turkey, from 6.7% in January 2015 to 17.8% in December 2016, it is equally true that Germany continued to receive the most applications throughout the entire period, with almost one-third of them, even towards the end. The exceptional increase has resulted in a rise in the number of asylees and refugees, albeit far under these numbers. Thus, even though the number of applications rose considerably since May 2015, the number of people with a residence permit for reasons of asylum is only increasing moderately, quite far from the volume of applications, reaching a ceiling of 1.3 million people registered in September 2016.

If we focus on the refugee crisis in the European Union, we can begin by highlighting that immigrants account for a minimum percentage of the total population and a very small proportion of the population born abroad in each European country (Fig. 2).

Figure 2. Population born abroad and refugees in each EU-28 country, 2016

Source: Author. Eurostat [*migr_pop3ctb*] [*migr_asypenctzm*]. Extracted on 5.12.17

Where they do reach a higher percentage, such as in Sweden, Austria and Germany, they only account for 1.3%, 0.9% and 0.7% of these countries' total populations. In absolute numbers, of the 1.09 million refugees living in the EU in 2016, 54.8% or 602,000 lived in Germany, trailed far behind by Italy, with 9.1% or almost 100,000, Sweden with 7.6% or 83,000 and Austria with 7.1% or 77,000, while Spain only had 20,340 or 0.04% of its population. And even though Spain is tied for fourth place with Italy in absolute numbers, with almost 6 million people born abroad or 13%, after Germany, Great Britain and France, in relative numbers it is lower in the ranking, in eleventh. Therefore, the Spanish government's reluctance to accept its assigned quota of 20,000 refugees, fewer than 1,000 of whom it had received by early 2017, seems unjustified.

Who were the main asylum-seekers in the EU in 2016? The largest group were Syrians, with 339,000 applications, accounting for 27% of the 1.3 million recorded that year (Fig. 3), followed by 186,000 Afghans and 130,000 Iraqis. Still, these figures are lower than those from 2015, when 668,000 applications were received from Syrians at the peak of the crisis. However, the statistics also reveal countries' willingness to accept them. According to the same Eurostat sources, few of these applications were actually processed, and the number of rejections was extraordinarily high. Spain stands out on both accounts as one of the countries that processes the fewest applications (fewer than 5% per year) and rejects the most (96.1%), aligning itself with Eastern Europe and Portugal in this pitiful statistic. It lags far behind Austria, Germany and Belgium, where between 85% and 95% of applications are in fact denied, although the number of cases processed and decided is far higher than in Spain (94,000 in Germany versus 580 in Spain).

Figure 3. Main nationalities of asylum-seekers in the European Union, 2016

Source: Author. Eurostat [*migr_pop3ctb*] [*migr_asypenctzm*]. Extracted on 05.12.17

Figure 4. Percentage of denials of applications of asylum, EU 2016

Legend:
- 25 - 50
- 50 - 75
- 75 - 85
- 85 - 95
- 95 - 100

Source: Author. Eurostat [*migr_pop3ctb*] [*migr_asypenctzm*]. Extracted on 05.12.17

Finally, specifically in Spain, from which countries do most asylum-seekers come? Examining the applications from 2008 to 2016 (Fig. 5), we can see that there is a mix of countries with recent armed conflicts – Syria and Ukraine, with 11,430 and 6,875 applications, respectively – and those suffering from acute political crises – such as Colombia, Cuba and Venezuela. Many of them have immigrant communities which have long been settled in Spain, such as Nigeria, Mali and Pakistan. However, the temporal aggregation conceals the succession of different origins: 86% of the Syrian and Ukrainian applicants came in the past two years.

Figure 5. Applicants for asylum in Spain, 2008-2016

Country	Applicants
Syria	11.430
Ukraine	6.875
Venezuela	4.880
Algeria	2.895
Nigeria	2.815
Mali	2.705
Colombia	2.195
Ivory Coast	1.925
Palestine	1.795
Cuba	1.325
Morocco	1.275
Guinea	1.060
Cameroon	1.040
Somalia	1.010
Pakistan	860
Honduras	775
El Salvador	750
Congo	695
Russia	645
Iraq	590

Source: Author. Eurostat [*migr_pop3ctb*] [*migr_asypenctzm*]. Extracted on 05.12.17

3. Schengen and fortress Europe: The mercantilisation of law

3.1. *Schengen, migration policy and the neoliberal utopia*

The temporary suspension of the Schengen Treaty and the closure of national borders, as on the French and Italian borders at one point due to the French government's desire to stop thousands of Tunisian refugees from entering after the Arab Spring in April 2011, has led to the belief that the Schengen Treaty on the free movement of persons and the idea of Fortress Europe are opposed to each other. The most widespread message is that the so-called "refugee crisis" is threatening the Schengen space.[1]

With the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, article 3 of the constitution of the European Economic Community stated that the objective of creating an internal market must entail eliminating obstacles to the free movement of people, services and capital. Consequently, one of the Council of Europe's first activities after approving the EEC regulations was to issue a statement on the free movement of persons (regulations from 1961 and 1964). However, it was not until the signing of the Schengen Treaty in 1985 that a migration policy was sketched out – who was able to move and who should not have access to the free movement area – that had nothing to do with the volume, direction or sociodemographic characteristics of the migrations occurring at that time, and even less so with those that would be

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[1] The Schengen space is comprised of the 28 EU countries minus Bulgaria, Croatia, Ireland, Romania, the United Kingdom and Cyprus, plus the states in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA): Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

precipitated in the new millennium. The design sought to devise a unified labour market within the neoliberal dream, as articulated by F. Hayek in 1944.[2]

Since the mid-1980s, and especially after the Schengen area entered into force in 1995, it was geared at transforming the existing flows into an ideal by: 1) trying to limit the arrival of non-EU immigrants to those with strong job qualifications, as a policy to attract talent; 2) encouraging what is called "internal mobility" for people with low qualifications, with the goal of mostly meeting this demand with EU workers; and 3) limiting non-EU immigrants to circular or seasonal migration programmes to the extent possible, which many authors, including the demographer Livi-Bacci (2012), have viewed as the desire to save integration costs.

Schengen is also at the foundation of the creation of what is known as Fortress Europe, since the dissolution of internal borders meant strengthening the external ones through coordinated action among the police forces of the different member states (Lasagabaster, 1996). After the Schengen Treaty entered into force, and as part of the migratory system it brought about, the Dublin Convention was signed in 1990, which sought to standardise asylum policies, although it was actually a move in a convergent, restrictive direction by spreading the suspicion that economic immigrants used the right to asylum fraudulently as an easy way to enter the different EU countries. Requests for asylum were associated with illegal immigration. Thus, also around this time, asylum started to be granted drastically less than before in almost all the EU members, even though we should recall that they were coming during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The implementation of the Dublin Treaty meant that asylum-seekers were logged in Eurodac – the digital fingerprint bank to monitor terrorism. In 2003, the Dublin II Convention introduced the concept of "readmission", which meant making the countries where the refugees arrive, which is geographically determined and begins with Greece and Italy, responsible for asylum. This is a procedure which seeks to force the EU countries to better control the periphery, and in the refugee episode in the summer of 2015 it explains the reluctance of both the refugees and some of the countries to register their entry when they clearly stated that their goal was to reach Germany or Sweden (Solanes Corella, 2016). In 2013, the entry into force of the new regulation, Dublin III, confirmed these principles even though it proclaimed that transferring asylum-seekers to member states where they run the risk of receiving "inhuman or degrading treatment" was explicitly banned.

The relationship between the limitation on asylum and the construction of a Fortress Europe became clear after the approval of the Amsterdam Treaty and the European Council of Tampere in 1999, which sought to harmonise member states' policies by adopting a common action programme for 2000-2005. The Hague Programme was precisely arranged around the development of a common asylum system, along with cooperation with the third countries from which the immigrants come, the fair treatment of nationals of third countries living in the EU and the effective management of flows (Pinyol, 2012). This how outsourcing to third countries became the leading border control practice in exchange for compensation, which was often calculated under the category of development cooperation, or by

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[2] We shall use the definition of neoliberal by the historian Daniel Stedman Jones (2012, p. 2) as: "the free market ideology based on individual liberty and limited government that connected human freedom to the actions of the rational, self-interested actor in the competitive marketplace".

favouring their nationals in migrations to the EU. This backdrop should be borne in mind in order to understand the framework of negotiations with Turkey as a solution to the "refugee crisis" in 2015. After the proposal to distribute refugees in the different EU countries with a quota policy failed because of many European countries' refusal and boycott, EU technocrats and states have rummaged through the neoliberal cash register. The measures have ranged from the co-payment of upkeep expenses proposed to the refugees – in Switzerland, Denmark and the German states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg – to zero-sum exchanges (one in, one out), which in practice have led to the goal of accelerating the expulsion of illegal immigrants (regardless of whether they are workers or refugees) so the refugees can "fit".

3.2. The 2015 refugee crisis

The migratory crisis in the summer of 2015 is also largely as much a consequence of the articulation of this outsourcing policy as the growth in refugees themselves (Ferrero & Pinyol, 2016). Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's threats to expel the estimated 2.5 million displaced persons in the Syrian conflict living in Turkey to the EU ended with the EU'S approval of 2.7 million euros meant to contain the Syrian refugees on 3 February 2016. Erdogan's negotiations with the EU sparked the totalitarian shift and the impunity with which internal repression was unleashed after the attempted coup d'état in July 2016. On 7 March of that same year, the EU representatives faithful to the principle of outsourcing border control had agreed with the Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to return the economic immigrants and refugees who had reached Greece from Turkey back to Turkey – including those known as 'hot returns'. This meant exchange of Syrian refugees based on the fact that for every Syrian returned to Turkey, the EU pledged to take in another, implicitly consigning non-Syrian refugees to expulsion, maximising the criminalisation of economic immigrants, restricting the profile of "refugee" and, by delegating the prevention of international immigration to the EU to Turkey, accepting the compromise of visa applications from nationals from the aforementioned countries which were suspected of sending flows towards Europe. In return, Turkey would receive substantial economic compensation, doubling the funds allocated until then to reach 6 billion euros, and the need for its citizens to get visas to circulate through EU countries was eliminated, in addition to extracting the promise to accelerate entry into the EU and being permissive with its interventionist aspirations in the war in Syria and human rights violations in its domestic policy. It is important to acknowledge that the payment for its gendarmerie does not even cover the expenses which the Syrian refugees had previously cost Turkey (Naïr, 2016). This solution meant the conversion of refugee camps, whose main purpose was to register the refugees who reached Greece's coasts and distribute them, into centres – called Hotspots – where they are classified in order to distinguish economic immigrants from candidates for refugee status and later detained and deported (Uriarte, 2016). The shift in direction, which de facto meant the militarisation of the camps, came hand in hand with actions to kick out the NGOs. The volunteers were gradually replaced by police officers and the soldiers sent by the EU, which is also a display of mistrust of the efficiency of the host states, Italy and Greece, which are suspected of being somewhat lax (Rodier, 2017).

　　In 2016, the World Economic Forum's Global Risks report cited what are called "large-scale involuntary migrations" as the global risk with the highest impact

and the most plausible one for the forthcoming decade, mixing flows stemming from armed conflicts with potential future flows due to climate change and economic migrations (WEF, 2016). One prominent component of its construction as a global risk is its potential relationship with terrorism, a connection noted previously (WEF, 2016) but this time associated with the immigrants' lack of integration in European societies. If we bear in mind the huge influence of these reports presented at the annual gathering in Davos on governments and corporations, the effort to come up with arguments in favour of hosting refugees, thinking about both Turkey and the EU countries, is actually noteworthy. Thus, praise is heaped on the benefits that displaced persons can bring to both the countries where they are in transit (spurring the demand, activating international trade, increasing monetary flows through remittances and enhancing the use of new technologies) and the host countries (supplementing the working population to offset ageing).

The crisis has ended up with an overwhelming manifestation of weakness: turning refugees into the Achilles heel of EU policy. This weakness is being exploited by authoritarian regimes like Turkey's via negotiations that spotlight the EU's dependence on it, while at the same time revealing a worrisome domino effect, both in the closure of internal borders of the EU countries and in the vulnerability of the external borders, once the Eastern flank has been armoured. Italy and Spain have already ventured to predict that they will become the next targets of the mafias that traffic in immigrants and refugees. Meantime, the UNHCR has calculated that there were a least 5,000 deaths in the Mediterranean in 2016, with the most traffic headed again to the central part. There has also been a series of massive attacks on the Spanish fences in Ceuta and Melilla in February 2017, albeit nurtured by the Moroccan government as a pressure measure in the negotiations of a new treaty on the fishing and agriculture agreements between Morocco and the EU. The Council of Europe gathering in Malta on 3 February 2017 to discuss migration policy regarding the Central Mediterranean route in order to respond to this expected and feared reactivation vociferously reinforced the principle of outsourcing border control with the worrisome decision to make the failed state of Libya the main partner and guarantor of the containment of flows coming from this geographic region, all in the name of building the resilience of the EU migration policy with an eye towards future crises (European Council, 2017).

3.3.   *Xenophobic populisms and EU migration policy*

One of the effects of the refugee crisis has been a retroactive questioning of accepting the Eastern European countries' candidacies. The heart of this rejection is the use of populist, xenophobic rhetoric, with the President of Hungary Viktor Orban at the helm. Yet the middle and working classes of the Western countries are also to blame, as their votes have led to the rise of far-right and Euro-sceptic parties. As Wendy Brown (2015a) claims, this populism can be interpreted in part as the expression of the grassroots desire for the restoration of sovereign power and protection, which are threatened as the state is transformed by globalisation. The solution, it is argued, is "more Europe", a concept understood as accelerating the EU member states' cession of sovereignty. This is one interpretation which fully falls within neoliberal orthodoxy, which ultimately seems to reach the consensus that the risk is not so much migrations as poorly managing them, states' protectionist reactions to the pressure that their electorates can exert, incapable of applying the

neoliberal mindset until the end. This is the stance upheld, for example, by Ian Goldin (2011), director of Oxford's Martin School, who was also in charge of the Global Risks reports published by the World Economic Forum since 2012. Golden upholds the need to construct a "world leadership" capable of imposing a liberal agenda which guarantees the priority of freedom of movement over "national" interests.

The increase in radical right voting around Europe, not only in the Eastern countries, has been countered by an increase in votes for the revived leftist parties and grassroots organisation. The upshot has been the polarisation, not the legitimisation, of an anti-democratic leaning fuelled by the political futility of Europe. It is mistaken to explain the democratic deficit and the rise of xenophobia in different EU countries with their idiosyncrasies and recent histories, as is often frivolously done with Eastern European countries or even Germany. Instead, this situation should be interpreted as a reaction to the implementation of economic adjustment measures and the adoption of neoliberal policies, which include the dismantlement of health coverage or housing assistance system, among other forms of social assistance, which have impoverished broad swaths of the population, explaining the upswing in populism and the disdain for liberal democracy. All of these are *sine qua non* requirements for their entry into the EU, with the first result being the expulsion of the population. We should incidentally recall that the massive wave of emigration caused by this process headed to the United Kingdom, among other destinations, fed the arguments in favour of Brexit (Coleman, 2017), and that even though the UK was outside the Schengen space, this nonetheless is a commentary on the contradictions and difficulties of forming a unified labour market by mobilising the workers from EU countries.

Naturally, we can hark back to a shameful past in all the European countries where radical right groups have surged, with episodes of racism, xenophobia or rampant fascist movements. But we should first underscore the fact that despite their nationalism and anti-globalisation rhetoric, they like presenting themselves as transnationals. Secondly, they never question economic liberalism or present an alternative. Thirdly, the majority of them have made an effort to distance themselves from their fascist past, and in any case they have abandoned the anti-bourgeois rhetoric of the 1930s (Norris, 2009). But most importantly we should stress that in the majority of these countries, these episodes were also associated with the crises in the growth of capitalism and their need to crush the resistance of the working class, from the 1929 Nazi crackdown in Germany to the growth of the National Front in France since the 1970s, feeding off of Algeria's independence.

4.   *Una furtiva lagrima*: Emotional mobilisation

4.1.   *"Post-truth" in the refugee crisis: Between fear and compassion*

In late 2016, Oxford dictionary's entry for "post-truth", defined as "relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief" (Oxford Dictionary, 2016) and its choice as the word of the year led to an onslaught of articles and studies claiming the importance of being able to mobilise emotions when constructing the political discourse. Besides the brilliant trajectory of this concept, which inevitably seems to lead to banalisation with the labelling of any manipulation or falsehood in the political discourse aimed at altering reality – in

short, any public lie – as "post-truth", this definition of the neologism and the popularity it swiftly attained should be taken not as the point of departure but as the culmination of a long epistemological process on emotions in social mobilisation and their relationship with the truth. This process ranges from the disdain of emotions, eclipsed by the concept of (economic) "rationality" as a driving force behind human actions in the market society, with the confinement of emotions to the family and private sphere (Heller, 1979), to valuing them as a constituent part of decision-making in the risk society (Brown, 2015b), especially in the capacity to anticipate the future or cope with what by definition is not only unknown to us but also unknowable.

The spread of post-truth would not have been possible had the dividing line between factual truth and opinions not vanished, which Hanna Arendt (2017) viewed as one of the many variations lies can have as a form of action, a basic element of politics. Transforming uncomfortable truths into opinions also allows manifest falsehoods to be elevated to the same status. The mutation of the role of emotions in shaping subjectivity has come parallel to the convergence of the rise in marketing and the spread of the new technologies (in media as well) in the past 30 years, including the generation of big data, the shift in communication policy and the consolidation of neoliberalism. All these trends have fostered the creation of populations corresponding to market segments to which different political messages are targeted depending on their characteristics. According to authors like Joyce Harsin (2015), this is the culmination of the transformation into the regime of truth, as Michel Foucault defined it (2001, pp. 158-159):

> The types of discourse which [each society] accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

The mercantilisation of emotions and what is called storytelling, the practice aimed at imposing ideas, generating meaning and controlling behaviours which has become essential in the governability put into place by neoliberalism (Salmon, 2008), have also played an essential role in legitimising a politics which needed to constantly fabricate a plausible narrative as the gulf between the EU's migratory management and the reality it was trying to subvert became ever larger. If we just focus on the use of emotions in constructing discourses with the aim of mobilising people around migrations from the Mediterranean border and the 2015 refugee crisis, we have to conclude that fear on the one hand and compassion on the other were the two feelings that have occupied the opposite ends of the political and media discourse. However, both of them, imbued with the feeling of belonging which is essential to understand processes of identity construction (Guibernau, 2017), were subjected to enormous tension precisely because of the impact that the acceleration of migrations and the diversity resulting from globalisation were having on social and demographic reproduction.

The discourse of fear has accompanied and been reinforced by the media turning refugees into security threats (Limón-López & Fernández de Mosteyrin, 2016). This has reinforced the siege mentality, which is essential to making Fortress

Europe acceptable; in the terms used by Giorgio Agamben (2004), it has facilitated the imposition of a permanent state of exception, turning the exception into the rule, which has grown apace with terrorist activity. At the same time, it is connected to the feeling of belonging by reinforcing the meaning of the community besieged by an always threatening *other*, here used to legitimise the discourse on restricting migration, along with the argument on the limits of the EU's ability to absorb more. The cry for compassion, in contrast, has sought identification with the refugees through belonging to the same community. This is the facet that interests us the most, which we wish to explore in the next section.

4.2.   *Plush-toy policies: Media replacement*

In order to understand the gradual emergence of empathy towards the refugees, stoking compassion, we shall analyse the repercussions of some of the pictures that went viral in the same summer of 2015, which perfectly illustrate this media-driven process. The corpse of the little boy Aylan on the coast of the island of Kos on 2 September of that year was the spark that ignited it for several reasons. First, because it took the picture of a lifeless child for public opinion to mobilise on a large scale, which had seemed immune to the death of all children and adults of both sexes who had scandalously preceded this snapshot for years. Secondly, because this boy, whose surname was Kurdi, was one of the children in a family of Kurdish refugees who had fled the city of Kobane, which had been destroyed because of the Turkish government's apathy as it witnessed the annihilation of its enemies, the Kurds, on the other side of its border as part of the ethnic cleansings with which sought to control and subjugate its own population, not to mention that these refugees are marginalised in their own land because they are Kurds. However, this story is silenced because it is uncomfortable and the goal is to avoid discomfiting these states, which are viewed as the EU's preferential partners that do nothing more than act as the Cerberus shuttling migratory flows back and forth.

As stated above, only the feeling of belonging can explain the impact of this snapshot. The categorisation of Syrian refugees as *peers*, or at least as victims that inspire compassion, occurred through their identification with the middle classes (Rodier, 2017), unlike Sub-Saharan or other economic migrants, whose phenotype, beginning with the colour of their skin, acts as a class marker. The first reports on the crisis stressed the use of mobile phones and credit cards, as well as their educational level, associated with some of them being fluent in English, and the increasingly astronomical figures that they had to pay their "facilitators" (which rose in direct proportion to the difficulties imposed by states and the EU).

The second picture is a humanitarian aid worker giving a plush toy to a Moroccan refugee boy upon the latter's arrival to Munich. This emblematic image was among many others of people who were moved to welcome the first refugees with plush toys. In this way, the replacement of a public policy managing immigration with philanthropy, in the hands of citizens' good will, is accepted, with the obligatory pictures of women. This image of solidarity contrasts with the journalist Petra Lazlo kicking children who were trying to cross the Hungarian border holding their father's hand on 9 September 2015. Before that month was over, the news had spread that the family who had been the target of this aggression had already been granted asylum and was living in Getafe, while the Spanish government continued to grumble about the refugee quota which it had been assigned in theory – and never met – and kept the majority of Syrian refugees who

had applied for asylum in purgatory for months, or even years. In 2015, and even until mid-2016, Spain had only allowed in 18 Syrian refugees in a shameful rehashing of its stingy behaviour during the Balkans war.

Appealing to emotions has sought to ignite indignation through images that move us and spark compassion. Yet this emotivity can eclipse a critical analysis of the situation. As Michel Lacroix (2001) pointed out, emotion as a mobilising agent entails two obvious dangers: 1) enshrining the state's (and EU's) inhibition and shifting that role to NGOs and volunteers; and 2) becoming a narcissistic reflection of self-compassion, limited to being a compensatory gesture of self-centred angst. The subsidiarity of NGOs, if not the migration industry (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Nyberg-Sorensen, 2011), either legally or not, has pushed decisions that should always be taken in the strict realm of rationality towards media circus, guiding the public by emotivity. What has fostered this prime role of emotivity is the lack of regulations based on social justice. Thus, we respond to applications for asylum and refuge with plush toys because of the destruction of the tangible social spaces where the refugees live – with the EU's complicity or passivity – and their desire to escape poverty with the unequal distribution promoted by a geopolitics that is the heir to European colonialism.

The European population has shown that it is willing to mobilise where their leaders have tended towards criminal passivity, in the best of cases. Grassroots solidarity can be found even in states where authoritarian gesticulations have monopolised the reaction to the refugee crisis. Having passed the peak of the crisis, the images lose power because of the very volatility of emotional consumption, yet also because the discourse of terror has completely enshrouded the issue after the rumours that a Syrian passport was found near the scene of the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015 (Bataclan disco, terraces of the nearby bars and the Stade de France), which justified the declaration of a state of emergency in France and the resumption of border controls with its neighbours in December of that same year (Guild, 2016). This find, which associated terrorism with refugees, was compounded by the events in Cologne at the end of the year (with recurrences in other German and Swedish cities) of women being subjected to sexual aggressions and robberies by groups of people identified as "immigrants".

5.   Conclusions: The thanatopolitical "pleat" and the refugee crisis

On 15 Marc 2016, an opinion piece was published in *El País* by José María Mena, former chief prosecutor on the High Court of Justice of Catalonia, on the imminent agreement between Turkey and the EU on refugees. He said:

> "Technically, legally, this is not geocide, because there is no direct intention to exterminate, which would be essential in order to file a suit in the International Criminal Court against the signatories of the preliminary agreement dated 7 March. However, there is a direct causality between the European governments' traitorous, cold lack of compassion and the thousands of people suffering and dead. They are tantamount to genocide."

Perhaps it cannot be considered genocide, but it is clear proof of the increasing pre-eminence of thanatopolitics in the 21st century. We use the metaphor of the "pleat" that Guilles Deleuze (2015) applied to Michel Foucault's

theory of the self to refer to the dual status of being inside and outside, of being simultaneously ontological and epistemological, and of referring equally to a practice and its problematisation (Probyn, 1992), in this case reflecting the twofold facet of power by including biopolitics and thanatopolitics. Thanatopolitics, the politics of death, from the Greek *thanatos*, meant as a mechanism that destroys human life with the consent or mediation of the state, which is supposed to protect life (Fernández Vítores, 2015), has always been present as a temptation and resource of biopolitics. This was noted by the Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito (2011), as Laura Bazzicapulo (2016) reminds us: thanatopolitics redirects us to the presence of violence in the sovereign decision on death, whereas biopolitics strives to protect and augment life. In this new millennium, the shift is clear. We can find it in the categorisation and decisions taken on migrations, and more flagrantly in the indifferent stance taken when faced with the deaths caused by migratory policies that are based on a mercantile calculus, which is sinister in the Mediterranean but equally so on the border between Mexico and the United States.

The landscape of redundancy, as Don Mitchell (2009) proposed calling the Holtville cemetery (California), with its interminable rows of anonymous crosses, where illegal immigrants who died trying to cross the border are buried, is nonetheless the silent counterpart of the abundance generated by competition. The extension of the wall between the two countries, built upon juicy business for the companies that benefit from the revitalisation of employment, is upheld on this apartheid which justifies death as outside political action more than as foreseeable. The apartheid industry generated by this policy ends up becoming a lobby; we have seen it in the defence of razor wire manufacturing for the sake of the development of the region of Màlaga, which has been besieged by unemployment. Yet we are also seeing it on a much larger scale in the business generated by the construction of the wall promised by the new president of the United States, Donald Trump, from cement companies to the high-technology industries applied to surveillance (deployment of sensors and drones), offshoots of the military industry. Thanatopolitics is the product of economic rationality, not folly.

The acceptability of the shift from biopolitics to thanatopolitics applied to immigration and refugees has needed the post-truth of the story devised by neoliberal think tanks such as those in Davos, applied unscrupulously the EU bureaucracy. The calculus of risk has been essential in this replacement of truth, where judgement of reality is replaced by mathematical evidence from the model and acts as a form of self-deception. In order for this to be possible, controlling and directing scholarly output (statistics as a production of reality) has been essential, guiding it towards not inquiring into the truth but confirming the political decisions that strengthen the market. The evaluation system of the main R&D projects in Horizon 2020 fall within this self-sustaining paradigm. On the other hand, this tendency has converged with the rise of the radical right, whose most important role has been to take over the traditional right and sectors attuned to the culturalist and xenophobic theses which are clearing the way for the acceptance of thanatopolitics in migratory matters.

In vain, we seek the decree or the open declaration of the battle against refugees or against illegal immigration. Frontex vessels and hypothetical armed actions are still being targeted against "traffickers". And yet, how should we view Foreigner Detention Centres, or the refugee camps where the population is divided between those who will be allowed in and those who will be expelled, or those who

will remain in a limbo of uncertainty? Within this context, recourse to the law may seem futile. How else, besides a maritime border, can we explain that assisting castaways is a violation of the law? How else can we justify the Greek prosecutor's accusation of human trafficking against the firefighters from Seville on 14 August 2016?

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Educational equity based on teachers' reflective autonomy

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Abstract

The expansion of accountability has fed the debate on the consequences of what is known as the evaluating state *on teachers' professional autonomy, in which a negative, mistrustful vision has prevailed. However, we should distinguish between two main models of accountability in education:* a) *the neoliberal model, which promotes the publication of school rankings and pressurises for results; and* b) *the teacher responsibility model, stemming from internal diagnostic assessments that activate teachers' reflective autonomy and initiate comprehensive school restructuring and innovation processes. The first model leads to the de-professionalisation of teaching and the steamrolling of its pedagogical authority, while the second model can enhance re-professionalisation and a renewed sense of the teaching team's public function. The "genuine school restructuring" movement based on bottom-up changes and innovations is an example of reflective autonomy that incorporates equity as a core objective. However, the educational community knows little about the* school effect and teaching *effect on equity due to the limited research carried out in Catalonia and erratic educational equity policies.*

Key words: teacher autonomy, educatíonal equity, teaching teams, educational change, reflective professionalism, teacher accountability.

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1. Clarifying the concept of *educational equity*

The educational community has not yet undertaken a well-grounded, evidence-based self-analysis on accountability aimed at promoting educational equity and improving the outcomes and opportunities in the most socially disadvantaged schools. The concept of educational equity is not firmly enough entrenched or well enough understood in the educational community, since an explicit framework of equitable policies grounded on research has not been created here, unlike countries with a stronger institutional and political tradition in the culture of equal opportunity. In fact, what predominates is a defensive rhetoric on equity and equal opportunity as an ideal worth striving for, while failing to outline the specific objectives, the priority action targets or the dimensions comprising educational equity.

Educational equity is built upon two complementary and interrelated cornerstones: equal opportunity and inclusion (Field, Kuczera & Pont, 2007). First, equal opportunity implies that ascriptive factors (gender, family social background, migrant or ethnic background or disability) should not be barriers that affect or determine educational careers. Equal-opportunity actions and policies are interventions that seek to level the initial conditions and the process so that talent, effort and individual capacity are the only factors behind outcomes. John Rawls (1998) is the seminal author on this normative conception of equal opportunity, which justifies the inequality of outcomes as long as it does not worsen the performance or status of the most disadvantaged groups, who deserve compensatory affirmative actions.

Equity introduces a component of justice to the concept of *equality*. *Equity* means that each person receives their due, or what they deserve, bearing in mind their differences and needs, without harming others. Therefore, equity is fairer than mere equality. In the opinion of Rawls (1998), justice should be understood as equity, such that some people's success or improvement should not come at the expense of others. In his opinion, social justice consists in equitably distributing resources and social goods, except when an unequal distribution ends up benefiting the least advantaged. This is what Rawls calls the *difference principle*, and it is the philosophical-normative underpinning that inspires positive discrimination actions and programmes to offset and redistribute resources. According to this principle, priority should be given to the most vulnerable children and adolescents and the most sensitive targets of the system where the most inequality lies (failure to graduate from secondary school, early school drop-out or segregation among schools).

The concept of educational opportunity does not refer to a hypothetical possibility but to a real option that could materialise through a public policy scheme which is activated to guarantee it. This is why each opportunity that is made the object of public policy should be evaluated and contextualised, bearing in mind:

a) the characteristics and needs of the target population that should benefit from it, and where the policies and programmes should exert their influence;

b) the goal or objective sought (lowering drop-out rates, segregation or school failure; increasing social inclusion; improving equal access to scientific degrees, etc.); and

c) the obstacles which come between the target groups and the goals or objectives, regardless of whether these barriers and conditions are internal or external to the educational system.

In education, equal opportunity depends on an equitable financing framework, a powerful scholarship policy, balanced and equitable enrolment among non-segregated schools and a comprehensive system structure with a unified core that delays the age of selection until 16 while also offering opportunities to go back to school and earn new degrees.

Secondly, inclusion consists in the universalisation of at least a minimum level of knowledge and competences that enable and equip everyone to develop their capacities as both citizens and workers (Field et al., 2007). Unlike equal opportunity, inclusion reflects a continuum logic not focused on prior conditions but on successive new adjustments to ensure that equal opportunity is universal and to minimise polarisation between the extremes while also elevating overall outcomes, especially those of more disadvantaged groups. While equal opportunity focuses on earning degrees, inclusion focuses more on acquiring functional competences for an active, cultural civic life to overcome the existing gaps due to gender, age, nationality, disability or social class.

Inclusion is reinforced by two complementary approaches: capacitating equality and reactivating equality, both of which stem from and are inspired by the work of Roemer (1998). Via capacitating equality, individuals are not responsible for their social backgrounds or the talents they have been assigned by nature's lottery, given that capacities, inclinations and talents are determined by their social inheritance, which must be neutralised. The unequal outcomes considered tolerable by this approach are only limited to those caused by individual decisions and choices. Authors like Nussbaum (2012) and Sen (2010) advocate this approach, defending a logic of empowerment that overcomes theories of deficits or shortcomings which end up reproducing compassionate, care-oriented paternalism. In education, the examples of reparative/capacitating equality include effective measures to attend to diversity, compensatory actions and positive discrimination in extremely complex settings, fostering positive parenting and strengthening parents' associations. In fact, it entails the axiological conception of educational inclusion, given that the school of the masses should universalise the capacity of all students who are learning while always minimising the influence of their social inheritance and family culture in their outcomes, motivation or aspirations.

Despite the efforts to apply capacitating equality meant as inclusion, the school of the masses reproduces and generates new inequalities without sufficiently attacking the underlying causes that condition individuals in their academic careers (Table 1). In order to guarantee full inclusion, reactivating equality is needed and new opportunities should be offered in the wake of failed life choices or poor decisions in the past that need to be reversed, especially in a collective setting which induces erroneous decisions, such as dropping out of school to work during an economic growth cycle (2000-2008).

Learning potential and earning degrees would thus be backed by reactivating mechanisms to re-empower people who have taken failed decisions, such as dropping out. Examples of this modality of reactivating inclusion in our current system include adult education, occupational training, second-chance schools, flexible accreditation of competences for vocational training degrees

based on work experience, and programmes encouraging people to go back to the university.

In short, the concept of equal opportunity is related to what is called *negative freedom*, which enables individuals to exercise their will even if they are not capacitated or sufficiently prepared to do so. Therefore, both capacitating inclusion and reactivating inclusion are exponents of *positive freedom*, which guarantees that individuals can exercise their will much more freely once they are emancipated from their ignorance by being capacitated and empowered. Education is intimately tied to *positive freedom*, and in order to guarantee it, teaching teams and schools have to use their reflective professionalism and the school's autonomy with accountability as the pivots of their equalising intervention.

Table 1. Dimensions of and approaches to educational equity

Educational equity		
Diminishing the influence of social background on the learning, aspirations, degrees and job placement of new generations with social and educational policies (financing, curriculum and faculty) that are appropriate for the need of the settings, neighbourhoods and social composition of the schools.		
Equal opportunity	**Inclusion**	
To equalise the initial conditions and trajectory by neutralising the ascriptive factors (family background, economic level, gender, nationality or disability) that are not the result of individual responsibility.	To universalise the basic sufficiency of knowledge and competences in order to equip everyone to develop their capacities and trajectories in social and economic life with no restrictions owing to their social background or condition.	
The resulting unequal outcomes must be limited to differences in individual talent, effort and capacity.	Elevating the capacitating and reactivating outcomes in order to strengthen social and educational cohesion.	
	Capacitating inclusion	*Reactivating inclusion*
	Talent or capacity for learning are socially determined. Only inequalities stemming from individual decisions and choices are legitimate.	The potential to earn a degree is conditioned by failed life choices (like dropping out of school) which require second chances.
Example: equitable financing, balanced enrolment, comprehensive structure of the educational system and scholarship policy.	Example: new assessment and competence-based curriculum, attention to diversity, positive actions for extremely complex schools.	Example: accreditation of competences, going back to school, vocational education organised into modules, adult schools, second-chance schools.
They attack and neutralise the **primary effects** of inequality.	It attacks the **secondary effects** of inequality.	
Negative freedom: Allows individuals to exercise their free will.	**Positive freedom:** Individuals can exercise their free will because they are equipped to do so.	

Source: Author.

2. Teacher professionalisation in a context of accountability

One of the most prominent of the multiple ongoing debates in the sociological research of education in on teacher professionalism. The publication of the book by Amitai Etzioni entitled *The Semi-Professions and Their Organization: Teachers, Nurses, Social Workers* (1969) sparked a great deal of research lasting until today. In Etzioni's opinion, teachers hold a unique status as a "semi-professionals", which they share with nurses and social workers. All three were and are occupations associated with the expansion of the civil service and welfare services (education, healthcare and social policy), and they also stand out for their high degree of feminisation and their focus on caring for people. The prevailing sexism in the social coding of the professions renders it disputable and unfair to describe these three caregiving roles as "semi-professionals" because of the inferior connotations of this expression. In any case, this has been used as a descriptive sociological category which reveals its ambivalence compared to the more prestigious middle-class liberal professionals (doctors and lawyers).

Another sociologist, Erik O. Wright (1989), stresses the same ambivalence when referring to teachers as "salaried intellectuals" with a contradictory class position which situates them between the middle class and salaried working class. The factors that lean teaching towards the professionalism common to the middle class include intellectual freedom, expert cultural capital and social and symbolic recognition. However, these "professionalising" factors coexist with factors that more resemble salaried work, such as dependence on the state and businesses, like contractors, or the bureaucratic regulation which determines their working conditions.

Since the early 21st century, there has been an intriguing debate on teacher "professionalisation" around educational restructuring based on neoliberal models and the new public administration (Lefresne & Rakocevic, 2016). With the expansion of the accountability mechanisms that seek to make schools and teaching teams more transparent and effective, there has been a great deal of controversy over the consequences of what is known as the *evaluating state* on teachers' professional autonomy (Maroy & Voisin, 2013; Neave, 2012; Whitty, 2000). However, we should distinguish between two types of accountability, which reflect two distinct neoliberal and educational policy restructuring systems that are often conflated (Dutercq & Maroy, 2017).

The first model corresponds to the neoliberal system that promotes the publication of school rankings that allow families to choose freely by creating quasi-markets and conditioning teachers' salaries (Mons, 2004; Martínez-Celorrio, 2003). This is the most widespread model in the English-speaking world (England, Australia, New Zealand and the United States) and in Holland and Sweden under right-leaning liberal governments (Lefresne & Rakocevic, 2016). The neoliberal model of educational policy is grounded upon external accountability, which confers power on the demand (families) to choose the school and shape the school market in such a way that the independent capacity for exchange between faculty and collaborative and online work are neutralised as professionalising spaces. The predominant result is teacher de-professionalisation (Whitty, 2000) because of the 'Taylorisation' based on the principle of teaching to the test and the consequent nullification of teachers' pedagogical independence, factors which trigger abandonment of the profession due to competitive stress and the outcomes to which they are subjected.

The second distinct model of accountability is policies in which teachers are held responsible not through the publication of rankings but instead evaluation-diagnosis and educational audits, which activate teacher training and development processes, as well as incentives for internal improvement and pedagogical innovation (Dutercq & Maroy, 2017). This is a kind of internal accountability that seeks to reactivate and improve the supply (the school's ability to attract) while trusting the faculty as independent agents of change and educational innovation with more responsibility for their social impact, especially in socially disadvantaged or highly complex settings. When properly applied, this model leads to teacher re-professionalisation, since it manages to successfully cope with new social and educational needs (Whitty, 2000).

Distinguishing between these accountability models is becoming increasingly necessary given the confusion which certain academic sectors and opinion streams have fuelled by taking the English-speaking neoliberal model as a whole that can be applied across the board instead of adapting it to their respective national, cultural and political settings. In this article, we assert that policies holding faculty responsible do not have the same consequences on teaching as neoliberal policies based on setting standards, teaching to the test and open competition among schools on market terms.

Teacher responsibility policies reflect the political objective of elevating the efficacy of the system, as well as the progressive objective of improving the equity of outcomes and boosting equal opportunity by delegating more independence to teacher professionalism (Maroy & Voisin, 2013). Teachers have to demonstrate "reflective independence", even though they have to do so under a framework of more control and accountability, which also encompasses equity objectives (Lessard & Tardif, 2004). The association between teachers' reflective independence and the improvement in equity and outcomes in disadvantaged environments has a long history in education, even though it has tended to be camouflaged or marginalised.

What stands out in Murillo's review (2005) is an entire tradition of research since the Coleman Report (1966) on outlier or exceptional schools which do not fit the expected pattern of social determinism, that is, schools in disadvantaged settings which stand out for their unexpected exceptional outcomes and the high degree of reflective independence of their instructors, who defend the educational project carved out in adverse conditions. All of these studies were systematically reviewed by Edmonds (1979), who summarised what was called the five-factor model that explains the success of these resilient, exceptional schools: leadership, high expectations, good school climate, a learning-centred orientation and finally continuous assessment and monitoring.

The tradition of research on school effectiveness focused on disadvantaged neighbourhoods has assembled a considerable body of concurring empirical evidence which, nonetheless, has been minimised by the sociology of education since the canonical influence of the Coleman Report (1966) and its social determinism. Outlier or exceptional schools and their educational transformation processes led by the teaching teams have been downplayed by sociological theorisations, which have regarded them merely as exceptions that prove the usual fatalistic rule of social reproduction.

3. The role of instructors and schools in equity

The conclusions of the infamous Coleman Report (1966) can be summarised by the catchphrase "school doesn't matter" as an instrument to lower inequality, which signalled the end of the egalitarian euphoria around the equalising power of schools in the face of external social factors. The report stated that "schools exert little influence on students, and their performance cannot be claimed to be independent of their status and social setting" (Coleman, 1966, p. 325). The three main results from the Coleman Report were:

a) Inequalities in school success by social class and ethnicity are not due to educational policy factors or resources (public spending, school facilities, teachers, ratios, curriculum, etc.) but to the external conditions of the families' socioeconomic and cultural deprivation.

b) The socioeconomic characteristics of the students and their classmates – and therefore, schools' social composition – are very strong external determining factors that limit schools' ability to equalise opportunities. One significant cause is the segregation of students by grouping them according to their socioeconomic status and ethnicity within the same school. The report stated that there was a great deal of racial segregation in schools in the United States. Eighty percent of white students went to schools where 90-100% of their classmates were from the same ethnic group, while 65% of the African-American students attended schools with classmates from their same ethnic group.

c) The importance of out-school inequality and social factors explains around two-thirds of the inequalities in school outcomes. Therefore, the priority should be lowering poverty and the social, cultural and job inequality that affect families, while also equalising the schools by eradicating segregation.

The different waves of PISA have confirmed that out-school social factors are the most determining in the inequality of outcomes, as reported in the Coleman Report and upheld by subsequent theories of social and cultural reproduction (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1978; Baudelot & Establet, 1986). School success or failure, academic careers and student performance are largely conditioned by the prevalence of what are called primary effects, which act in combination: social class, family cultural capital, parenting styles and family social capital (Gorard & See, 2013; Ferrer, 2011; Jackson et al., 2007). Numerous authors in the economics of education have also focused on the influence of social factors on students' performance and careers (Calero, 2007; Hanushek & Wößmann, 2005).

In countries like Great Britain, the relative contribution of primary effects on the total inequality of outcomes once reaching adulthood is quite strong (76%) (Jackson et al., 2007). In the United States, primary effects, and therefore out-school inequalities, explain more than 66% of the inequality of outcomes between white and African-American students (Phillips et al., 1998).

Coleman (1966) revealed that schools' pedagogical actions and resources explained 4.95% of the variance in mathematics performance at the age of 14 for white students and 8.73% for African-American students, without bearing in mind the socioeconomic status of either group. The outcomes of the canonical Junior School project in Great Britain reveal that the magnitude of the equalising effect of school was 10% (Mortimore, Sammons, Stoll, Lewis, & Ecob, 1988). In Spain,

Murillo (2005) rated the equalising effect of schools at 10% of the variance in mathematics and 4% in language, natural sciences and social sciences.

Other studies prior to PISA estimated the equalising impact of schools at around 20%, and there is continued confirmation that it is higher in mathematics than in the other subjects (Teddlie & Reynolds, 2000). More recent comparative studies, especially in the "effective schools" vein, have also demonstrated that schools' net contribution to equalising and neutralising the social inheritance stands at around 20% (Sammons, 2007), an added-value magnitude that is not negligible but actually quite respectable given the major conditioning power of out-school inequalities.

We know that the strongest equalising impact exerted by the educational system comes in preschool, a period when the children of families with low cultural capital and no reading skills benefit the most compared to students from other social backgrounds (Cebolla-Boado et al., 2015). According to this research, the equalising effect of preschool gradually diminishes throughout primary school (ages six to eleven) until reaching secondary school (ages twelve to sixteen), when it disappears entirely and the reproduction and magnification of the original inequalities predominate. For this reason, the equalising investment, either large or small, made in preschool ends up being squandered because of the academic and selective logic imposed in secondary school, which later translates into excessive early drop-outs among youths with low employability in the job market, most of them from low and modest social backgrounds.

However, theories of the reproduction or evidence of social determinism in school outcomes tend to capture the structural pattern but do not sufficiently explain the dispersion of outcomes within either schools or social classes (Torrents et al., 2018). Nor do they explain why certain schools in disadvantaged neighbourhoods achieve high outcomes and overcome the expected social determinism, or why other schools in advantaged settings achieve lower outcomes than expected given their social composition. This is what is known as the *school effect* in the sociology of education.

In fact, the school effect was actually captured by Coleman (1966) when he demonstrated the enormous influence that good teachers exerted on African-American students and students from other poor minorities (Crahay, 2000). Other authors like Jencks and Phillips (1998) also reconsidered their 1972 position on the impact of socioeconomic factors on school performance. Drawing from more recent databases, they concluded that the school's influence on students was not insignificant but rather the best predictor of performance, especially among students from socially disadvantaged backgrounds.

The research by Calero and Escardíbul (2017) in Spain found that the best teachers – those who had the greatest net impact on learning – are over-represented in publicly-subsidised private schools and among socially advantaged students. The distribution of good teachers in the system is therefore regressive and not equitable, and it comes at the expense of the more disadvantaged students, who need them the most and whose outcomes are the most sensitive to whether or not they have good teaching teams. Comparative research continually finds that socially disadvantaged students tend to attend poorly equipped schools with worse teachers and less instruction time (OECD, 2010).

Recent studies show the unequalising role of schools. For example, Schmidt et al. (2015) demonstrate how didactics and the way maths are taught explain 37% of the performance gap between socially advantaged and disadvantaged students in the United States. In Spain, according to this research, didactic in-school factors explain 42% of the gap in outcomes in mathematics. Therefore, despite the strong influence of out-school social determinants of inequality, there is also significant room for improving equity and reversing the reproduction of educational inequalities. The system itself produces social selectiveness and unequalises capacities with didactic practices, routines and inappropriate designs that deprive disadvantaged students of opportunities for meaningful learning, even though they are paradoxically the ones that need the school effect the most (Hanushek & Wößmann, 2010; Causa & Chapuis, 2009).

Therefore, despite the fact that the weight of out-school factors is crucial in explaining the inequality of outcomes, we cannot ignore in-school and pedagogical factors; indeed, stratification at selective points in the system, didactics, assessment, student organisation and the tradition of making students repeat years are all key factors in schools' reproducing the social determinism of outcomes. For example, numerous studies demonstrate the negative effects of having students repeat years and grouping them by ability, which are direct causes of inequality, demotivation, bullying and abandonment without any proof that they boost graduation rates (Bridgeland, 2010; Brophy, 2006).

Finland has a comprehensive system based on constant personalised support and optional modularisation of the baccalaureate, which includes contents delivered both inside and outside the schools, such that students create their own curriculum. Instead of repeating an entire year, they only repeat those modules or areas that they did not pass. Their repeat rate is 4% (Välijärvi & Sahlberg, 2008). In Spain, 33% of students aged 15 have repeated some year throughout their school careers. The problem is that this rate is 53% among students from disadvantaged backgrounds. In fact, at the same PISA competence level, the system makes disadvantaged students in Spain repeat up to four times more than other students (Martínez-Celorrio, 2017). How can we explain this discrimination but through the action of in-school factors?

The annual cost of repeating years is 14% of the spending in primary and secondary school in Spain (OECD, 2011). In Catalonia, which has a lower rate of repeaters in primary and secondary school, the cost of repeating may account for 7.5% of total school spending, which is equal to 320 million euros per year. This amount could be capitalised by eradicating repeats and earmarking the resources to more personalised solutions, mentoring, modularisation and inclusive comprehensiveness, as Finland does.

On the other hand, the sociological literature has shown that grouping students by ability levels, also known as streaming, in all classes is not an occasional, reversible measure but the polar opposite: it ends up being instituted in schools as an irreversible measure of horizontal segregation. What is more, the assignment to levels is based on performance and behaviour criteria, behind which lie the factors of social class, ethnicity and poverty. Oakes (2005) demonstrated that the poorest youths and those from ethnic minorities are more likely to end up low-level groups, even if they have higher abilities. Nusche's (2009) meta-analysis reached the same conclusion. Once again, regardless of cognitive capacities,

schools reproduce the Matthew Effect, which penalises the most disadvantaged sectors that are the most prone to benefit from good teachers and good schools.

In Catalonia, it is estimated that around 30% of students age 15 are grouped into low-level streams, predominantly in the public education network and among students with lower-class social backgrounds, even though this measure improves neither their outcomes nor their aspirations (Aymerich et al., 2011; Ferrer, 2009). Streaming in all classes works as a negative Pygmalion effect, a self-fulfilling prophecy which leads the most vulnerable students who are the least motivated by the contents towards abandonment, insufficient competences and a rejection of school.

We need an in-depth reconsideration of how to educate the new adolescents under a framework of more inclusive, personalised and efficient comprehensiveness, without repeating or streaming; we need a framework where a more collaborative and a less individualistic and balkanised teaching culture prevails (Hargreaves, 1996). According to the OECD's TALIS report (2013), 87% of Spanish secondary school teachers have never observed other teachers in the classroom, a figure which is twice the OECD mean, and which plunges as low as 5% in Korea. Almost half of Spanish teachers (48%) have never participated or collaborated in joint activities with teachers in other subjects. This is also twice the OECD average (23%), while in countries like Poland and Denmark, this individualistic profile applies to only 10% of teachers.

Secondary school has been made to resemble baccalaureate by many teachers, who have never actually assimilated comprehensiveness and the increased diversity in the classroom as challenges to their professional and teacher growth. The new out-school social changes require an in-depth revision of the curriculum and the ways of teaching and learning at school, not limited to the classroom (Fernández-Enguita, 2016). The prescribed curriculum has to be trimmed and made more flexible, and more organisational freedom of spaces and time should be given to teaching teams that are better trained and use active methodologies and interdisciplinary approaches (Coll, 2016; Martínez-Celorrio, 2016). The over-academisation of secondary school is a process that has distorted the original features of attention to diversity that must be remedied, and the purposes and methodologies of secondary school teaching have to be redefined with an eye to the future.

Therefore, schools and teaching teams do not play a neutral role, and they "do matter", especially when they are effective in disadvantaged settings or offer appropriate attention to the socio-educational complexity not by lowering levels but via curricular justice and encouraging designs that generate resilience and new aspirations to overcome (Connell, 2006; Levin, Roldán & Garchet, 2000; Apple & Beane, 1997; Slavin, 1996). We need to gain a more detailed understanding of the educational transformation processes led by the teaching teams in exceptional schools which overcome the social determinism of their settings and the role the reflective autonomy of the teaching teams plays in this.

4. School autonomy and genuine school restructurings

Decentralising schools and giving them autonomy is a way states can distribute power in a bid to increase efficacy, better adapt to students and channel the stakeholders' democratic participation (Meuret, 2004). Pedagogical,

organisational and administrative school autonomy is conditioned upon outcomes as an evaluative way to monitor the system. Both factors, autonomy and accountability, are crucial in improving educational quality, as stated in different reports (Woessmann, Luedemann, Schuetz & West, 2009). It is worth noting that only certain English-speaking countries have published school rankings to promote market logics, but many countries use the diagnostic evaluation of outcomes as an internal measure of improvement.

Despite the existing cases of school change and transformation processes stemming from diagnostic evaluations or internal self-diagnostics in Catalonia, even now these processes have been neither mapped nor described in all their typological diversity. For this reason, we need to focus on at least two new research questions which have barely been examined in countries like ours:

a) What type of reflective autonomy among teachers appears in the change processes influenced by pedagogical audits and internal evaluations?

b) How does teacher reflective autonomy incorporate equity in the reformulation of the new educational plans?

We do not know whether we can compare what types of reflective autonomy or what associated approach to equity exist either in recent experiences of educational change (anonymous schools, Escola Nova 21 and Xarxes per al canvi [Networks for Change]) or in more longstanding experiences like communities of learning, which have never been evaluated or compared to each other. More fieldwork and systematic case studies are needed to generate new empirical, well-grounded information which would help capture how reflective autonomy and the explicit or latent conception of educational equity and inclusion have strengthened these change processes.

Since there is no systematic information on the school effect and the teacher effect in improving the equity of outcomes in our country, simplifying mythologies which see the neoliberal hand everywhere and mistrust any discourse on accountability are more easily perpetuated without contestation. However, for decades, sociological and pedagogical research into educational change has shown that teachers' reflective autonomy can feasibly lead to genuine school changes that do not cater to market interests. Genuine educational change is a concept that was coined in the United States in the mid-1990s to define public school restructuring and transformation processes that met the following characteristics (Goodman, 1995; Lieberman, 1995):

- They are restructurings led by the teachers themselves, and therefore not innovations prescribed by others.

- They share the objective of transforming not only classroom didactics but also the school's pedagogical plan by redefining the purposes of education in order to adapt them to social and cultural changes.

- They stem from a shared, well-grounded diagnosis among all the stakeholders in the educational community.

- The teachers accept and embody values like mutual trust, reflective professionalism, intellectual rigour and community, which stand in contrast to the values upheld by the top-down, technocratic restructuring of education (efficacy, performance, standards and school rankings).

- Finally, they surpass and go beyond the traditional models of pedagogical and classroom innovation which have been subordinated to improvements in academic productivity.

Genuine restructuring is based on schools' autonomy and freedom to innovate in order to meet the diverse range of needs and to promote valuable performance without lowering levels through active pedagogies and radical transformations in the school space/time. Therefore, they are bottom-up responses by certain groups of teachers and schools that do not share the techno-bureaucratic model which has stripped the core purposes of the system down to efficacy, productivity and improvements in academic outcomes. Perhaps the example of the most advanced, consolidated genuine restructuring in Spain is Amara Berri in the Basque Country in preschool and primary school (Martínez-Celorrio, 2016).

Spain is a country that does not stand out for the high degree of autonomy conferred on schools in international comparisons. Great Britain, Holland and the Scandinavian countries have given their schools more freedom in terms of both curriculum and resource management, and historically they have operated through municipal control and school districts. Compared to the OECD mean, Spain gives schools little autonomy in defining their curricula, hiring teachers or financially managing their budgets. Even countries like France, Italy and Germany grant more financial autonomy than Spain does, although the curricular autonomy of their schools is lower than in Spain (Consejo Escolar del Estado, 2015).

Innovative schools with genuine internal changes have taken advantage of the scope of autonomy regulated by the successive Spanish education laws since LOGSE (1990), LOPEG (1993), LOE (2006) and LEC (2009). The current education law encourages educational experimentation and innovation, as reported in article 1n of the LOE (2006), which the LOMCE (2013) retained verbatim. The schools that have been transformed bottom-up by their teaching teams have defined their school education plans, outlined their year-by-year breakdown and decided on their own methodologies, teaching materials, student groupings, cross-curricular topics and timetables. Optimising their freedom to take decisions in these areas, these schools have ventured to experiment with new pedagogical models that go beyond mere classroom innovation. In order to outline what innovative schools are like and what they do, we can list a decalogue of the characteristics they have, with differing degrees of intensity, which also enables us to distinguish them from other schools in the system (Martínez- Celorrio, 2016):

1. They exemplify genuine school restructuring processes which take advantage of school autonomy to transform the organisation, the spaces and times, the methodologies and the relations with students by agreeing to a new school project that is global and systematic, with a unique, creative response that is not prescribed or imposed from above (administrations, universities or experts).

2. They prioritise students and their right to learn at the core, as opposed to conveying teacher-centred subjects, and they put into practice teaching and evaluation methodologies that seek to personalise, attend to diversity and achieve authentic, motivating performance.

3. They have overcome the constraints of the official curriculum and textbooks by putting into practice project-based learning, curricular globalisation and

competence-based learning as invisible pedagogies based on the cross-cutting nature of knowledge.

4. They practise formative evaluation with feedback for students to measure successes, creations and competences qualitatively, overcoming the routine of the exam and the traditional numerical, summative, classificatory evaluation.

5. The schools' focus on invisible pedagogies allows them to change the rigid structure of times and spaces and instead create flexible time brackets, classroom corners and new classrooms designs and spaces for teamwork.

6. They allow and promote a diversity of ages in classrooms and work groups by mixing students so they interact and take responsibility among their peers in order to overcome the traditional school model which rigidly classifies students by grades and ages.

7. The school projects are legitimised by the active participation and horizontal engagement of the administration, teachers, families and students, whose mutual trust coalesces around a living, dynamic project in constant improvement designed to be lasting and to be updated over time.

8. They focus on invisible pedagogies and cooperative work, which allows students to be framed and treated in a different way and dissolves problems of coexistence and demotivation by generating a warm school with an affective and positive emotional climate.

9. The key to the change process is reflective teachers who act and get involved in a truly collaborative professional culture, with an interdisciplinary, comprehensive approach to education and a strong school identity that overcomes the isolated identities of subjects, which tends to balkanise teaching teams.

10. In this new shared school culture, the classic division between formal and informal learning is blurred. This makes the school an organisation open to its setting, which it enriches and from which it learns, and with which it forges collaborative networks and mutual alliances.

Our thesis is that the innovative or advanced schools which are part of the current wave of genuine change in Catalonia and Spain have successfully experimented with and created a new matrix and new school format based on reflective teacher autonomy (Martínez-Celorrio, 2016 & 2017). For this reason, their change processes have an authentic or genuine meaning. These schools restructured themselves without external prescriptions, appropriating school autonomy to transform the classic teaching matrix inherited and reproduced by the rest of the system.

In the specialised literature on educational change, there is a high degree of consensus on the harmful effects of systemic, centralised reforms or changes prescribed top-down which hinder or eliminate schools' autonomy. As Darling-Hammond (2001) stated, new didactic models appear every decade which tend to be recycled old ideas, like the new maths, modular timetables or goal-based management. The administration or those prescribing these models introduce them in schools, but they tend to be poorly digested since they seem removed from real practice, accepted routines and crystallised didactic conceptions.

The sociology of education has amply demonstrated how schools change, distort and recontextualise reforms so they appear to be following the dictates to such an extent that their original meaning vanishes (Tyack & Cuban, 2001; Bernstein, 1998). Technocratically planned top-down reforms or innovations are not adopted as expected. What prevails in the school world is a micro-policy of informal changes, resistances to change and conflicts over the meaning of the innovations prescribed top-down. The end result is "pedagogical hybrids" in which old and new practices are mixed together, making a "de facto curriculum" that does not match either the official curriculum or the legitimate practices expected by the government. In contrast, when the educational restructuring comes bottom-up based on the reflective autonomy of teaching teams, a much more coherent, articulated and engaged educational and curricular project takes shape which once again evinces the five-factor model: leadership, high expectations, good school climate, a learning-centred orientation and continuous assessment and monitoring.

There are case studies in the United States on genuine restructuring and the way public schools have appropriated and internalised them as a transformative project (Lieberman, 1995). It should be borne in mind that the peculiar way education is governed in that country has allowed the paradigm of school-based management (SBM) to blossom and expand. Initiatives like charter schools and whole school designs are other examples of genuine restructuring which the teachers involved consider their own. Whole school design is an example of the global transformation of public schools allowed by school districts which tend to be drawn up by foundations and university research centres as an alternative to overcome the traditional compensatory education in disadvantaged places. Examples include the Success for All programme designed by Slavin (2008), and the accelerated schools formulated by Levin (Levin, Roldán & Garchet, 2000), with solid *ex post* evaluations of their outcomes and impacts.

In Spain, the learning communities promoted by the Community of Researchers on Excellence for All (CREA) research group at the University of Barcelona are a transfer of Henry Levin's model of accelerated schools. However, unlike them, CREA does not allow schools flexible leeway, since they have to incorporate methods and recipes deemed "successful", which are imposed as prescriptions for three years. Nor does Spain have any rigorous evaluations of outcomes with control groups, *ex post* outcomes of students' academic careers (even though they have been in place for some time), comparisons among them or experiences which have failed. In fact, even though it comes from a university research centre, its promoters have been more focused on publishing self-referentially in academic journals than on objectively and scientifically demonstrating what works and does not work in their uniform prescription, despite the fact that they present themselves as supporters of scientific information (Fernández-Enguita, 2014; Coronado, 2013). Nonetheless, CREA learning communities have spread quite successfully around Spain and become a powerful network of 200 new schools, even though many of them do not adopt the identity of a learning community. Still, their peculiar form of prescriptive experimentation, the lack of reliable and independent evaluation and the excessive mobility of teachers and their abandonment of the schools prevents them from being considered examples of genuine restructuring springing from the reflective autonomy of the teaching teams themselves.

As Antúnez (2001) points out, the feasibility of educational changes depends on teacher initiatives and leadership, as they act as an internal engine in schools which think of themselves based on reflective and collaborative professionalism. Achieving this sophisticated degree of critical mass and authenticity is not at all easy in the system as a whole, and therefore innovative schools are "islands of change" which go against the stream of the standardised school model, and some of them located in extremely complex socio-educational settings actually become outliers or exceptional schools because they manage to overcome the social determinism of their settings.

5. Accountability with regard to equity in primary school

The accountability existing in the Catalan school system reflects the model of teacher responsibility based on diagnostic evaluations which activate internal change processes. These are local, micro-situated projects in specific schools which have embarked on internal improvement processes. Despite the interest in ascertaining the similarities and differences among all these multiple processes, no comparative, anonymised research has been published in Catalonia that enables us to deduce lessons and successful experiences of both failed and successful internal change processes. In contrast, in the Basque Country a comparative study was published on schools with a high and low added value, bearing in mind their social settings of educability (Lizasoain, 2015).

Recently, the Education Consortium of Barcelona (Consorci d'Educació de Barcelona, 2017) has publicised the outcomes of the basic competence tests in the sixth grade of primary school in all the public schools in the city of Barcelona for the first time, bearing in mind their degree of socio-educational complexity. The publication of this information enables us to tentatively analyse whether or not there are exceptional schools which get high or good outcomes despite the adversity of their neighbourhoods and the socio-educational complexity with which they have to cope. Table 2 shows the total number of schools classified by their complexity (very high, high, medium-high, medium-low and low), as well as the intervals of students who receive lunch aid (as an indicator of poverty and family deprivation). First, we can see how the ranges or intervals of lunch aid recipients are not coherent with the degrees of high or low socio-educational complexity, despite the fact that a more proportional fit it would be more coherent. Secondly, it is worth pointing out that only 40% of public schools (58 in total) have medium-low or low socio-educational complexity, while the remaining 60% have extreme or accentuated conditions of complexity and poverty. As we have no data on the city's publicly-subsidised private schools, we cannot calculate how the ratio of complexity and poverty is distributed among all the primary schools in the city's system, even though we can guess that they primarily fall on the public schools.

Table 2. Socio-educational complexity of the public primary schools in the city of Barcelona

Socio-educational complexity of the school	Ranges of lunch aid recipients	Total number of schools	%
Very high	66% - 19%	29	20%
High	43% - 15%	27	18%
Medium-high	38% - 8%	32	22%
Medium-low	15% - 3%	58	40%
Low	16% - 1%		
Total Barcelona		146	100%

Source: Author based on data from the Education Consortium of Barcelona (2017).

However, here we are more interested in ascertaining how many schools are capable of overcoming the social determinism of their expected outcomes on basic competence tests. Out of a total of 146 public schools in the city of Barcelona, 106 (73%) achieve the outcomes expected given their social setting: low and medium-low outcomes in situations of very high, high and medium-high complexity on the one hand, and high and medium-high outcomes in schools with medium-low and low complexity on the other. That is, 73% of the schools evince social determinism in their outcomes.

The remaining 27% of primary schools in the city of Barcelona can be broken down into 20% outlying or exceptional schools which overcome the social determinism of their settings characterised by high or medium-high complexity, and 7% of schools in settings of medium-low or low complexity that show lower than expected outcomes, which we call under-performing schools (low and medium-low outcomes). Accountability makes it easier for public school administrators to have access to this information, which can be shocking or unexpected for the educational community. In fact, among the 58 public schools with medium-low complexity, or indeed with no complexity and lunch aid lower than 16%, we can find 10 under-performing schools with low and medium-low outcomes, as shown in Table 3.

If we break schools down by degree of complexity, we see that 93% of the schools with very high complexity reproduce the social determinism of their disadvantaged settings, and only 7% are resilient or exceptional schools which show much higher outcomes than expected given their settings of multiple deprivation. Likewise, 33% in contexts of high complexity are exceptional. In contrast, 59% of schools with medium-high complexity are resilient. Therefore, we can posit a hypothesis that as there is a lower concentration of students with direr family deprivation, and as the social composition is more inter-class, the likelihood of finding resilient, exceptional schools increases. The second hypothesis is that they are resilient or exceptional because of their innovative use of the schools' autonomy and the transformative and re-professionalising power of the reflective autonomy of teaching teams until they have crystallised a more equitable, inclusive educational plan.

Table 3. Schools with or without social determinism in the outcomes in the public primary school network in the city of Barcelona

Socio-educational complexity of the school	Total number of schools	Number of schools with social determinism	%	Number of schools without social determinism	%
Very high	29	27	93%	2	7%
High	27	18	66%	9	33%
Medium-high	32	13	41%	19	59%
Medium-low					
Low	58	48	83%	10	17%
Total Barcelona	146	106	73%	40	27%

Source: Author based on data from the Education Consortium of Barcelona (2017).

If we jointly consider schools with high and medium-high complexity (a total of 88) in the city of Barcelona, we find that 37% are resilient or exceptional. What is worrisome is that no public primary school in the Ciutat Vella district is resilient; however, at least 50% of the public schools in the Nou Barris district are (with high or medium-high outcomes despite the setting of difficulty and socio-educational complexity). Why do schools with the same profile in disadvantaged settings in the same city generate such unequal outcomes? The question to ask is not why 37% of the school are resilient and exceptional but why education policies allow 63% of the schools with very high and high complexity to produce low outcomes at the end of primary school.

6. Conclusions: Towards an explicit framework of educational equity

The accountability generated by diagnostic evaluations tends to re-professionalise teaching teams, which undertake restructuring and transformative innovation processes in their schools. We need more empirical information and case studies on the types of improvement and their scope in the system as a whole. Despite the crucial importance of external inequality factors, schools and teaching teams cannot ignore the internal factors that affect educational equity. Certain exceptional or resilient schools attain high and medium-high outcomes despite the settings of socio-educational complexity in which they exist. In the city of Barcelona, they account for 20% of public primary schools, a percentage which is significant enough that they should not be treated as a trivial, anecdotal exception. Their restructuring projects, which belie social determinism, have been based on the reflective autonomy of the teaching teams and their commitment to equity, inclusion and high expectations of success for all students. They tend to contest and somewhat nuance the classic results of the Coleman Report and subsequent reproductionist theories solely focused on the social determinism of outcomes.

The reflective autonomy and professionalism of teaching teams make it possible for 20% of the public primary schools in the city of Barcelona not to reproduce the social determinism of their settings. In the usual discourses and rhetorics of much of the educational community, accountability and diagnostic tests are mistrusted as a neoliberal, mercantile anathema which avoid a more solid, proven debate. The model of conferring responsibility on teaching teams which

stems from accountability is accepted by certain teaching teams, who end up consolidating sound educational projects based on their reflective autonomy and achieve outlying or exceptional outcomes in extremely difficult settings.

However, what is missing is strong leadership in public policies to encourage reflective autonomy among teachers and improve outcomes as a replicable model in settings of high complexity. Nor is there a middle ground of cooperation and reciprocity among schools in complex settings which would allow for networking and mutual enhancement of teaching teams. To remedy this situation, the erratic state and current tentativeness of education policies in equity matters must be overcome in order to boost accountability, teachers' reflective autonomy and the construction of professional capital capable of overcoming the social determinism of the setting.

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Variability in patterns of national identity based on mother tongue: the case of Andorra

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Abstract

Social psychology studies the psychological mechanisms involved in the construction of national identity. The theoretical framework of this study is based on integrating the main concepts of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1984), which states that individuals are members of different social groups and that they identify as members of some of these groups with varying degrees of commitment and feelings. This article analyses the relationship between family language and identifying with the national project in a group of young people socialised in the Principality of Andorra. The data were collected through a survey of 514 people with different backgrounds, family languages and nationalities. The results show that the family language is the variable that correlates the most strongly with national identity. Among the population of Andorra, there are different degrees of levels of identification with the country according to family language, and while some languages are constructed as exclusive categories, others are considered compatible and inclusive in relation to the country.

Key words: family language, national identity, self-categorisation.

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1. Introduction

Social psychology explains how people come to consider themselves members of certain social groups and how this influences their inter-group relations. The theoretical framework of this study is based on integrating the main concepts of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1984; Tajfel & Turner, 1989), according to which individuals are members of different social groups (linguistic, national, etc.) and identify and categorise themselves subjectively as members of some of these groups with differing degrees of commitment and feelings.

According to Barrett, Lyons, and Del Valle (2004), a person's age, cognitive development, nation of origin and/or residence, national group, geographic location within the nation, ethnicity, language use, media consumed, attendance at a given school and family practices are all factors that generate and explain the existence of considerable variability in patterns of national identification.

Also, according to Barrett, Lyons, and Del Valle (2004), language use and national identity are closely related. In fact, one factor associated with the importance of how people identify nationally is the language they use to communicate. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the mere fact of speaking a language determines the degree of importance attached to a given national identity.

It seems more reasonable to assert that speaking a certain language is a consequence of a value system and a given ideology espoused by the family. Even though we know that constructing a national identity is diverse and complex, sometimes there is a mimetic relationship between knowledge of a language and the feeling of national identity associated with it (Vila, 2006).

In fact, there is a relationship between national identity and language, but national identity is not synonymous with knowledge of the language. That is, differences have been found in the importance attributed to national identity by people who use different languages with their families. People deliberately use a language to express or reaffirm their sense of national identity, such that national identification and the practices derived therefrom are key factors which predispose one to certain language usages (Vila et al., 1998).

The causal factor implied in language use, as well as the importance attributed to certain national identities, is associated with family ideologies, values and practices.

Nation states have used the language regulated by the state for the purpose of conveying certain dominant cultural representations. Through language, people are exposed to contents which prescribe certain national representations that are acquired when participating in the communication of a given community.

Therefore, in communities, the factors of language and sense of belonging play an important role in shaping the sense of national identity. Given that the balance between these factors can vary depending on the languages present in the context and the degree of belonging, considerable variability is expected in the construction of the sense of national identity among citizens.

The notion of citizenship and its concept associated with identity play a core role in socialisation processes. The notion of citizenship related to a *conservative* position stresses the creation of a model of free, equal citizen in order to improve the nation. This position stems from Romanticism and the Enlightenment. The

state is responsible for nationalising the territory and developing a national consciousness among its citizens. This conception has a one-way view of individual identity, focused on *private and particular factors*, such as language, ethnicity, origin, beliefs, religion and gender associated directly with the state.

In contrast, the *modern* notion of citizenship assumes that each individual, regardless of their language, ethnicity, origin, beliefs, religion or gender, has the same rights as any other person and is obligated by the same duties, expressed as laws, which are the outcome of the social contract and the commonweal. From this position, the state becomes a nation through the free association of individual wills as a guarantee of individual freedom. Therefore, identity affiliation is understood as a national affiliation where citizenship is detached from any private trait like language, gender, ethnicity, beliefs, religion or gender.

Based on the modern conception of citizenship, the construction of national identity is a *public*, *shared*, *unique* matter which is possible through acknowledgement of equality and individual freedom within society's diversity. Individual differences are a private matter which cannot be considered in the communal sphere, and therefore what is truly important is constructing a single identity associated with the citizenry and affiliated with the state-as-nation as a guarantee of social cohesion.

This study focuses on the sociopolitical and linguistic context of the co-principality of Andorra, a country in Europe with seven centuries of history, even though it is not a member of the European Union and is nestled between two states: France and Spain. The political and social events of the past 50 years have led to a high degree of self-governance and a heterogeneous demographic composition resulting from the arrival of an avalanche of foreigners, primarily from Spain, France and Portugal, who have considerably changed its identity status. According to recent figures from the survey on language knowledge and use of the population of Andorra, the languages that have a strong social presence in the country are Catalan, the official national language even though it is a minority language, which is predominant in administration, banking, finance and legal matters and is defended by Andorran public schools; Spanish, the language spoken by the majority of inhabitants and commonly used by the large population segment from Spain and South American countries; French, a language which is commonly known because of the proximity to and traditional political relations with the neighbouring country; and Portuguese, a language with rather low social prestige yet a strong presence on the streets, since Portuguese residents largely comprise closed group impermeable to integration.

The objective of this article is to analyse the construction of national identity in adolescents and adults living in the Principality of Andorra. Specifically, the relationships between self-categorisation, feeling of belonging and comparative identity are analysed in relation to family language.

This study seeks to describe the relationships between family language and the subjective dimension of national identity. To do so, three specific objectives are proposed:

- To study the impact of the main family language on national self-categorisation.
- To analyse the interrelation between main family language and the feeling of belonging to the land.

-    To analyse whether comparative identity is influenced by the main family language in which the respondents were socialised. The hypothesis guiding this study is based on the idea proposed by Giles and Johnson (1981), which seeks to show how the official state language is used to mark a group belonging which is integrated into national identity.

Thus, this study seeks to show how in the Principality of Andorra, the Catalan language is used to mark a group belonging which is integrated into the national identity. In this case, the people who use Catalan in their families should describe themselves as Andorran, while people who use languages other than Catalan in their families would describe themselves first as something other than Andorran.

The fact that Andorra is a country with many languages is enriching for the population, since language is a very important means and medium of integration at all levels, as well as a way of reproducing national identity.

2. Methods

2.1.   Design

The research methodology used in this study is quantitative based on a conclusive transversal design, as information was only collected once from a single sample.

2.2.   Participants

The population includes all residents of Andorra between the ages of 17 and 44 who have done all their compulsory education in one of the three education systems in the country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship status and language. Given the target and nature of this study, focusing on the population over the age of 16 living in Andorra was determined suitable. The justification of this choice is the consideration that at younger ages the national identity dimension may be present in people's lives but is much more confused and less crystallised than later, at ages when they should begin to have sufficient judgement to form a well-grounded opinion on this matter. On the other hand, 1984 is the year when the three educational systems started to coexist simultaneously with the creation of the Andorran school 32 years ago. The maximum age to begin compulsory secondary education is 12, and therefore we added these two values to obtain a maximum sample age of 44.

The sample was designed using stratified sampling. The population of 31,025 people was divided into four strata corresponding to the different kinds of education in Andorra: denominational Spanish schools, public Spanish schools, French schools and Andorran schools. The sample from private Spanish schools was not borne in mind because of the difficulty finding people who had been fully educated just in these schools.

Simple random sampling was applied within each stratum. Using the criterion of simple assignment, 125 subjects were chosen for each stratum. The sample error was 4.29% for a confidence level of 95%.

A total of 514 people participated in the study, 217 of whom were men and 296 women. The mean age of the participants was 27. The most common places of birth in the sample are Andorra (73.7% of the total), Spain (17.5% of the total) and

Portugal (5.6% of the total) and the mean amount of time they had lived in Andorra was 26 years. The entire sample did their compulsory education in one of the three educational systems existing in Andorra, which ensures socialisation within the same setting. The sample was divided by family language (Catalan, Spanish, French, Portuguese, bilingual). The participants' most common mother tongue was Catalan, followed by Spanish and Portuguese and Spanish/French and Catalan/French bilingualism.

2.3.   Instrument

Sociodemographic and national identification questionnaire

A questionnaire designed specifically for this purpose comprised of sociodemographic questions and questions on national identification was administered. It explores a group of young Andorrans' subjective identification through three tasks: a self-categorisation task, a feeling of belonging task and a comparative identity task. Within this article, the data from the questionnaire reveal the sociodemographic features of the participants as well as information on their family language.

2.4.   Tasks

Subjective identification

This task examines national self-categorisation through identity categories grouped into national categories, such as *Andorran*, *Spanish*, *Portuguese*, *French* and *Catalan*; regional categories such as *Pyrenean*; supranational categories such as *European*; age categories such as *young*; and geographic parish categories such as *Encamp*, *Canillo*, *Escaldes*, *Ordino*, *la Massana*, *Andorra la Vella* and *Sant Julià de Lòria*. The *young* category was included in case anyone found none of the categories of national identity important in their self-description.

Feeling of belonging

The participants were asked to choose the options that best described their own feeling of belonging within Andorra. The three possible categories were *Andorran*, *Pyrenean* and *European*.

Comparative identity

This task asked the subjects to choose the situations which best described their own feeling of comparative identity, establishing relationships between two different categories, the first option being *Andorran-European*, the second *parish-Andorran* and the third *Andorran-Pyrenean*.

2.5.   Procedure

The questionnaire was administered individually and took approximately 5 minutes to fill out. The participants were told that the objective of the research was to ascertain their opinion on the issue of Andorran national identity, and their anonymity was guaranteed. In terms of the *self-categorisation* task, we used a set of 15 cards with words belonging to different categories written on them (national,

territorial, regional and supranational, and one category not belonging to the field of national identity) in which they could choose attributes like "young", "Andorran", "French", "Portuguese", "Catalan", "Spanish", "European", "Pyrenean", "Andorra la Vella", "Escaldes", "Sant Julià", "Ordino", "La Massana", "Encamp" and "Canillo".

The fifteen cards were spread out in front of the subject in a random order, and they were asked to choose three to describe and define themselves. The cards not chosen were set aside, and then the subjects were asked to order the three they had chosen from most to least important in order to determine the degree of importance they attributed to their national identity, with the first being considered the category with which they identified the most strongly. The cards were scored from 1 to 3, with 1 the most important and 3 the least important.

The tasks for feeling of belonging and comparative identity were closed-ended questions in which the participants marked a cross in the answer they considered the most appropriate.

In the *feeling of belonging* task, the participants had to choose one of four possible options to describe three kinds of feelings of belonging. The choices were presented in degrees of "very", "fairly", "not very" and "not at all".

In the *comparative identity* task, they had to choose one of five possible options to describe three types of situations of comparative identity. The choices for the first situation were "Andorran", "more Andorran than European", "equally Andorran and European", "more European than Andorran" and "European". The choices for the second situation were "from my parish", "more from my parish than Andorran", "equally from my parish and Andorran", "more Andorran than from the parish" and "Andorran". The options for the third situation were "Andorran", "more Andorran than Pyrenean", "equally Andorran and Pyrenean", "more Pyrenean than Andorran" and "Pyrenean". The task is designed so that people from Andorra can define a specific feeling of identity by comparing the different categories *national-regional*, *national-territorial* and *national- supranational*. People who do not feel Andorran are expected to categorise themselves via the supranational, regional and/or territorial categories more than as Andorran.

3. Results

3.1.   *Self-categorisation and main family language (MFL) task*

The results on main family language and self-categorisation show that the Catalan-speaking group is the only one that identifies with the category *Andorran* as their first choice. The Spanish-speaking, French-speaking and Portuguese-speaking groups identify with other categories than *Andorran* as their first and second choices, even though *Andorran* does appear before any other national category. The category *European* never appeared in the French-speaking group. In contrast, the category *European* appeared before *Andorran* in the Portuguese-speaking group.

The contingency table (Table 1) shows that the relationship between language and the subjective identification task is significant.

Table 1. Correspondence between main family language and self-categorisation

MFL	Young	Andorran	Parish	Spanish	Catalan	Pyrenean	Portuguese	European	Active margin
Catalan	71	92	29	3	25	2	0	4	226
Spanish	88	39	21	23	3	4	0	2	180
Portuguese	39	2	2	0	0	1	5	0	49
Active margin	198	133	52	26	28	7	5	6	455

Source: Author

Thus, we can see that the family language in the *Catalan* category is directly associated with self-categorisation as *Andorran*, and the main family language in the other linguistic categories, Spanish and Portuguese, is associated with the self-categorisation *young* more than *Andorran*.

MFL Catalan group

In 84.5% of cases, the Catalan-speaking group identifies with the category *Andorran*, followed by the category *parish* in 66% of the cases and the category *young* in 60% of the cases.

Table 2. Main family language Catalan and self-categorisation

MFL	No. valid cases	Valid percentage	
Catalan	226	100%	
Subjective identification	**No. responses**	**Percentage**	**Percentage of cases**
Young	136	20.1%	60.2%
Andorran	191	28.2%	84.5%
Parish	149	22%	65.9%
Spanish	12	1.8%	5.3%
Catalan	87	12.9%	38.5%
Pyrenean	40	5.9%	17.7%
Portuguese	52	7.7%	23%
European	5	0.7%	2.2%
French	5	0.7%	2.2%
Total	677	100%	299.6%

Source: Author

MFL Spanish group

In 75% of cases, the Spanish-speaking group identifies with the category *young*, followed by the category *parish* in 69% of the cases and *Andorran* in 65% of the cases, even though the category *Spanish* appears in 45% of the cases.

Table 3. Main family language Spanish and self-categorisation

MFL	No. valid cases	Valid percentage		
Spanish	180	100%		
Subjective identification	**No. responses**	**Percentage**	**Percentage of cases**	
Young	135	25%	75%	
Andorran	117	21.7%	65%	
Parish	124	23.%	68.9%	
Spanish	81	15%	45%	
Catalan	15	2.8%	8.3%	
Pyrenean	41	7.6%	22.8%	
Portuguese	19	3.5%	10.6%	
European	5	0.9%	2.8%	
French	3	0.6%	1.7%	
Total	540	100%	300%	

Source: Author

MFL French group

In 100% of cases, the French-speaking group identifies with the category *young*, followed equally by *parish* and *Andorran* in 64% of the cases. The category *European* was never chosen by the French-speaking group.

Table 4. Main family language French and self-categorisation

MFL	No. valid cases	Valid percentage	
French	11	100%	
Subjective identification	**No. responses**	**Percentage**	**Percentage of cases**
Young	11	33.3%	100%
Andorran	7	21.2%	63.6%
Parish	7	21.2%	63.6%
Catalan	3	9.1%	27.3%
Pyrenean	2	6.1%	18.2%
Portuguese	1	3%	9.1%
French	2	6.1%	18.2%
Total	33	100%	300%

Source: Author

MFL Portuguese group

In 92% of cases, the Portuguese-speaking group identifies with the category *young*, followed by *parish* in 71% of the cases and *European* in 47% of the cases, as well as by *Andorran* in 43% of the cases.

Table 5. Main family language Portuguese and self-categorisation

MFL	No. valid cases	Valid percentage	
Portuguese	49	100%	
Subjective identification	**No. responses**	**Percentage**	**Percentage of cases**
Young	45	30.6%	91.8%
Andorran	21	14.3%	42.9%
Parish	35	23.8%	71.4%
Spanish	1	0.7%	2%
Catalan	2	1.4%	4.1%
Pyrenean	8	5.4%	16.3%
Portuguese	12	8.2%	24.5%
European	23	15.6%	46.9%
Total	147	100%	300%

Source: Author

3.2.   Task on feeling of belonging and main family language

In terms of the interaction between *main family language and feeling of belonging in Andorra*, the data show that the subjects who speak Catalan feel very Andorran and that those who speak Spanish feel fairly Andorran. The subjects whose main family language is Portuguese are between the categories of feeling "fairly" and "not very" Andorran.

The contingency table shows that there are significant differences in the relationship between feeling of belonging in Andorra and main family language.

Table 6. Correspondence between main family language and feeling of belonging in Andorra

MFL	Very Andorran	Fairly Andorran	Not very Andorran	Not at all Andorran	Active margin
Catalan	133	80	12	1	226
Spanish	51	86	31	12	180
French	1	9	0	1	11
Portuguese	6	28	11	4	49
Active margin	191	203	54	18	466

Source: Author

In terms of the *feeling of belonging in the Pyrenees* and *main family language*, the results show that the subjects whose main family language is Catalan are situated in the categories of feeling "fairly" and "very" Pyrenean. The subjects whose main family language is Spanish are between the categories of "fairly" and "not very" Pyrenean, and the subjects whose main family language is Portuguese are between the categories of feeling "not very" and "fairly" Pyrenean.

The contingency table shows that there are significant differences in the relationship between feeling of belonging in the Pyrenees and main family language.

Table 7. Correspondence between main family language and feeling of belonging in the Pyrenees

MFL	Very Pyrenean	Fairly Pyrenean	Not very Pyrenean	Not at all Pyrenean	Active margin
Catalan	60	105	49	12	226
Spanish	19	61	67	33	180
French	2	4	3	2	11
Portuguese	3	13	22	11	49
Active margin	84	183	141	58	466

Source: Author

There are no significant differences in the relationship between feeling of belonging in Europe and main family language.

3.3.   *Comparative identity and main family language task*

With regard to *comparative Andorran-European identity* and *main family language*, the results show that the subjects whose main family language is Catalan are situated in the category of feeling "Andorran" and "more Andorran than European". The subjects whose main family language is Spanish are situated between the categories of feeling "more Andorran than European" and "Andorran". And the subjects whose main family language is Portuguese are situated between the categories of feeling "equally Andorran and European" and "more Andorran than European".

The correspondence table shows that there are significant differences in the relationship between comparative identity Andorran-European and the main family language.

Table 8. Correspondence between main family language and comparative identity Andorran-European

MFL	Andorran	More Andorran than European	Equally Andorran and European	More European than Andorran	European	Active margin
Catalan	109	69	31	15	2	226
Spanish	46	57	41	18	18	180
French	3	4	2	2	0	11
Portuguese	9	11	17	6	6	49
Active margin	167	141	91	41	26	466

Source: Author

With regard to comparative identity and main family language, there are significant differences in the relationship between the comparative identities Andorran-European and Andorran-Pyrenean in the Catalan-speaking group and the Spanish-speaking group. The participants who speak both Catalan and Spanish feel Andorran first.

With regard to the *comparative identity Andorran-Pyrenean* and *main family language*, the results show that the subjects whose main family language is Catalan, Spanish and Portuguese are situated in the categories of feeling "Andorran" and "more Andorran than Pyrenean".

The correspondence table shows that there are no significant differences in the relationship between the comparative identity parish-Andorran and main family language.

The correspondence table shows that there are significant differences in the relationship between the comparative identity Andorran-Pyrenean and main family language.

Table 9. Correspondence between main family language and comparative identity Andorran-Pyrenean

MFL	Andorran	More Andorran than Pyrenean	Equally Andorran and Pyrenean	More Pyrenean than Andorran	Pyrenean	Active margin
Catalan	113	67	34	7	5	226
Spanish	62	56	43	9	10	180
French	3	1	6	0	1	11
Portuguese	16	18	12	1	2	49
Active margin	194	142	95	17	18	466

Source: Author

4. Conclusions

With regard to the hypothesis of showing how the Catalan language is used to mark a group belonging which is part of the national identity in Andorra, the data verify this solely in people who only use Catalan within their family milieu. People who use languages other than Catalan with their families describe themselves in other ways before Andorran, even though the category Andorran does appear before any other national category. One special case is the Spanish-speaking group, whose self-categorisation, feeling of belonging and comparative identity are more ambiguous, as this group does not categorise themselves as Andorran but do strongly relate their feeling of belonging with the Andorran group.

The impact of the Catalan language on constructing national identity and shaping the feeling of belonging to the Pyrenean Andorran region are factors that should be considered in the construction and social affirmation of a shared identity in Andorra. In Andorra, identity is constructed in reference to different belongings and different spheres, including social, linguistic, national, supranational, territorial and regional. In fact, the data show that one can have a multiple, plural,

composite identity which is easy to accept and can coexist in a totally harmonious, complementary and inclusive way.

Therefore, it is also worth noting the coexistence of multiple identities in this study, Pyrenean and Andorran in the Catalan- and Spanish-speaking groups and European in the Portuguese-speaking group, as well as the category of *parish* and *young* in the French-speaking group.

Language is one of the basic elements defining identity, and like the nation, it has been shaped over the centuries and is a fundamental component of culture. Andorra is the only state where Catalan is the sole official language. Catalan is identified with the territorial, regional and national identity and is the language of the Andorran public administration (government, communes and General Council), the national education system and the autochthonous inhabitants. Knowledge of Catalan provides access to certain jobs, is a means of integration and confers a certain national status. Even though it is a minority language, Catalan enjoys support from both the official institutions and the national media. The Catalan language is felt to be Andorra's own language and is a symbol of national identity.

This article is part of a broader study analysing the interrelation between the language and school variable and Andorran national identification. The data and results shed further light and greater detail on the factors involved in the process of constructing the national identity.

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Transport and mobility infrastructures on the Balearic Islands. Challenges and perspectives

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1. Introduction

The European Union views transport and mobility policies as essential factors in territorial development. Transport policies should contribute to lowering regional disparities and especially provide access to island and peripheral regions, such as the Balearic Islands. Promoting transport infrastructures and mobility policies is thus a basic factor in economic, social and territorial development.

In the specific case of the Balearic Islands, the fact that they are islands, unlike the region of Valencia and Catalonia, forces them to depend more heavily on these policies, which thus become a decisive cornerstone in the islands' economic development, even more so if we consider that in addition to being island territories, the Balearic Islands are also comprised of small, distinct territories. Transports, especially those to and from abroad, are necessarily structural factors for small, divided territories, especially Menorca, Ibiza and Formentera, which is magnified by their twofold and threefold insularity in the transport of both travellers and goods.

In terms of the territory, the recent evolution of transports on the Balearic Islands have followed two clear driving forces which explain both the design of the networks and their weaknesses. The first is the heavy influx of tourists from both Spain and abroad; since the 1960s, this has led to constant growth in infrastructures, which are highly developed in relation to the islands' demographic size. This is particularly true of the airports, which are the prime means of

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international passenger transport, compared to the ports, which specialise more in goods and interregional passenger travel.

The second, the product of the combination of strong demographic expansion associated with successive waves of immigration and the diffuse spread of urbanisation, along with a series of public policies which have promoted the use of private transport in recent years, explains the development and design of the surface transport network, which generates a largely unsustainable mobility pattern, as clearly reflected in the low representation of public modes of transport in commutes as a whole.

Ultimately, the archipelago's specialisation in tourism determines the structure and features of the islands' transport infrastructures, which are closely tied to the needs and seasonal flows of the tourists themselves.

Without failing to acknowledge the importance of motor transport in the island's economy, its nature and the effect it has on international transport adds even further difficulties and costs to local industry and agriculture, which are nonetheless strategic sectors in the evolution towards a more economically diversified model. In contrast, it is important to recognise the increase in accessibility and connectivity from the islands to the heart of Europe brought about by the tourism model, which is not only a fundamental flow in the tourist-residential economy but also ushers in new formulas to export products and strategies to promote research and innovation policies.

2. The connection with the outside world

The fact that the Balearic Islands are islands means that everything – passengers and goods – has to go through its official gateways: ports and airports. The Balearic Islands' ports have become the gateway for goods, while the airports are the hub of passenger transport. Eighty-five percent of travellers come via airports, while 99.6% of goods are transported by sea (Table 1). The dependence on the tourism model is reflected in the seasonality indicator (70%), which is identical in both air and sea transport, that is, for both passengers and goods. In the case of air travel, connectivity is quite broad, while by sea, Barcelona and Valencia are the main connections.

Table 1. Operativity indicators of air and sea transport on the Balearic Islands (2013)

	Air Transport	Sea Transport
Passengers carried (%)	85.7	14.3
Goods carried (%)	0.16	99.84
Connectivity for passengers[1]	139	12
Dominant market	International	Domestic
Seasonality of tourist flows[2]	70.7	69.7

[1] Number of connected ports or airports

[2] % of passengers carried between May and September over the yearly total

Source: Authors based on data from AENA and Port Authority of the Balearic Islands.

2.1.   Airports, the main gateway to the Balearic Islands for tourists

Any change in the Balearic Islands' economic cycles has a direct impact on air traffic; indeed, the evolution in air traffic is the clearest indicator of the evolution in the islands' tourism. In 30 years (between 1985 and 2015), the volume of passengers who have used the islands' airports has risen from 12 to 33 million. And 2015 and 2016 saw new record numbers of passengers thanks to the incipient economic recovery after years of crisis. Indeed, perhaps it was even a consequence of the crisis: in the past two years, the effects of the political crises and Islamic terrorism in North African and other countries and safe destinations have been felt. This and the new forms of cooperative tourism (the "Air BNB effect") have boosted traffic in recent years.

Despite these spectacular figures, the airports on the Balearic Islands have lost specific weight within the Spanish airport system during this period. For example, while they handled almost 24% of total air traffic in 1985, and Palma was ranked second in number of passengers – and first in the summertime – its share is currently 16%, while the ranking of the Palma airport, the largest on the Balearic Islands has gone down a notch, replaced by Barcelona. Another negative point is the scant diversification of destinations that can be reached, which are determined by the strategic interests of the airlines, the most important of which are British and German "low-cost" airlines, which have made the phenomenon of year-long residential tourism possible. Paradoxically, the connections among the islands, which are less interesting to airlines, and between Menorca and Madrid between October and May, are subjected to the rules on mandatory public services, a measure which has proven to be insufficient given the airfares that many residents have to pay for their obligatory commutes.

The importance of each means of transport on the Balearic Islands also stems from the very layout of the region (Table 2). Because of its size, Mallorca accounts for 76% of total passenger transport. The more than 23 million passengers Son Sant Joan carried in 2015 make it the third busiest airport in Spain in traffic, only surpassed by Madrid and Barcelona.

Table 2. Passenger traffic share and air mobility rate. Balearic Islands, 2015

	Passengers	% over total Balearic Islands	Air mobility rate[1]
Mallorca	23,745,023	71.7	28
Ibiza	6,477,283	19.6	48
Menorca	2,867,521	8.7	30
Total Balearic Islands	33,089,827	100.0	30

[1]Air traffic passengers/resident population.
Source: Authors based on statistics from AENA, 2015.

Looking towards the future, the Balearic Islands' demand for participation in airport management is the crux of their claims. Given all the airport issues, the local political and economic institutions have been upholding the need to create a new airport management model with the participation of the Government of the Balearic Islands, Island Councils, town halls, chambers of commerce and other economic and social stakeholders. That is, it is suggesting co-management between the state

entity AENA and regional public stakeholders so that without going so far as privatising the airports, they can be managed in a consensual fashion with the goal of halting the constant increase in the infrastructures' capacity and flows while meeting the real accessibility needs of everyone, both residents and visitors alike. However, it is also essential to keep sight of the inescapable connection with the islands' economies, and of course the territory's carrying capacity, which is often questioned by the size of an increasingly large gateway.

2.2.   Ports, an alternative under expansion

The duality between state- and region-run ports is also a handicap when guiding maritime transport policies. The largest ports (Palma and Alcúdia on Mallorca, Ibiza, La Savina on Formentera and Mahon on Menorca) are managed directly by the Spanish Port Authority. The others, sports marinas and fishing ports, are managed by the Government of the Balearic Islands. Only Ciutadella – under regional management – is a strategic port in terms of maritime connections with Mallorca thanks to its proximity to Alcúdia, with which it provides regular passenger connections. It has thus started to compete with the port of Mahon, traditionally the leading port on Menorca, leading to dysfunctions given that they are run by different administrations.

As mentioned above, ports on the Balearic Islands serve as a gateway for the entry of goods. This is a key factor in the economy, and the islands would be unable to hold out more than a few weeks without this constant influx of products – most of them meant for tourists – which supply the island population with more than 13 million tonnes of goods unloaded. This traffic primarily comes on horizontally-loading Ro-Ro ships on all the islands, which facilitates their distribution because it averts the need for lengthy loading and unloading operations in the ports (Table 3).

Table 3. Indicators of coastal traffic and tourist cruise ships in the main ports of the Balearic Islands, 2015

	Passengers on regular lines	%	Goods (Tn)	%	Passengers on cruise ships	%
	embarked and disembarked		embarked and disembarked		at base and traffic	
Palma	791,851	15.8%	8,340,649	62.4%	1,721,906	87.2%
Alcúdia	265,804	5.3%	1,522,648	11.4%	1,365	0.1%
Mahon	120,499	2.4%	696,679	5.2%	59,342	3.0%
Ibiza	2,164,876	43.1%	2,537,684	19.0%	190,308	9.6%
La Savina	1,679,449	33.4%	268,509	2.0%	1,539	0.1%
Balearic Islands	5,022,479	100.0%	13,366,169	100.0%	1,974,460	100.0%

Source: Authors based on the Port Authority of the Balearic Islands.

Despite the predominance of cargo transport, there are also regular passenger lines with Barcelona, Valencia, Denia and Alicante, which are the main connections between the peninsula and the Balearic Islands. The majority of lines that make these routes operate with ferries, but there are also horizontally-loading Ro-Ro ships which carry both passengers and lorries loaded with goods. In recent

years, this traffic has also been joined by tourist cruise ships, which brought almost 2 million visitors in 2015, making the port of Palma the second busiest in this sector in Spain.

3. Unsustainable land mobility

Land mobility on the islands has clearly evolved towards private vehicles, and the cause is known: a huge expansion of roadway infrastructures, especially on Mallorca and Ibiza since 1998 (Table 4), and justified by the increase in demand, which has enormously facilitated motorised travel in private vehicles. In contrast, there has been a comparatively lower and less planned investment in collective transport. The effect has been quite striking around the region and has led to major transformations in the landscape, in addition to impassioned social and civic protests (Seguí, 2008).

One of the consequences of this evolution is the high level of motorisation among islanders, which stands at almost 900 vehicles/1,000 inhabitants, one of the highest rates in Europe. This phenomenon is a constant on the islands, where the growth in the vehicle fleet is higher than the demographic growth.

Table 4. Indicators on the evolution of the roadway network on the Balearic Islands

Indicators	1998	2008
Total length	2,200 km.	2,169 km.
Motorways	59 km.	94 km.
Two-lane roads	7 km.	90 km.
Others	2,134 km.	1,985 km.
Intensity rate	2.76 km lanes/1,000 inhabitants	2.15 km lanes/1,000 inhabitants
Density rate	0.44 km lanes/km2	0.43 km lanes/km2

Source: Authors based on the Statistical Yearbook of the Ministry of Public Works, 2008 and the Statistical Institute of the Balearic Islands (IBESTAT).

Palma, where almost half the island population lives, and which is home to the main exterior transport infrastructures, has the largest number of tourist places and the highest concentration of companies. It is the true centre of the roadway network. Its expansion has also contributed to consolidating a metropolitan ring of neighbouring towns. The urban expansion throughout the entire metropolitan area follows the extensive occupation model, with large bedroom communities generating the most daily round-trip commutes for work and study, as well as flows for shopping and leisure, which have migrated out towards the periphery. Thus, the main entryways to the city become bottlenecked, rendering the first ring road running around the outside of the urban nucleus obsolete.

Ibiza has also experienced a major expansion of its expressways, especially with the development of the ring roads around Vila (E10, E20) and the motorways leading to the Airport and Ibiza-Sant Antoni.

On Menorca, where the traffic is the lowest, there has been less roadway development. Right now, the aborted project to split the Me-1 Mahon-Ciutadella motorway is still in the air, although it is primarily controversial because of the two-

tier interchanges, which would not fit in well with the preserved Menorcan landscape. What stands out on Menorca is a high-density ring around the capital, Mahon, mostly associated with trips to the airport and residential and tourist urbanisations. Also important within its territorial context are the average daily intensities recorded at the entrances to the main urban nuclei.

Needless to say, tourism also has a powerful effect on the roadway network. The excessive use of rental vehicles as the mobility of choice for tourists, strongly driven by the upswing in the residential tourism model, loads the entire network with vehicles, in some cases bringing it close to saturation point. Furthermore, the seasonal component is also quite noticeable.

Given the mobility pattern, which is as unsustainable as it is persistent, it should come as no surprise that the 2006 Sectoral Transport Steering Plan of the Balearic Islands made the revival of collective transport one of its priority objectives, a necessary step in working towards a balance of land transport on each of the islands. This includes regular urban and interurban passenger roadway transport on all three islands and railway transport on Mallorca, the only island with a railway system, distinguishing between conventional interurban trains and the urban underground. On Menorca and Ibiza, improvements in frequency and the construction of intermodal stations in the cities of Ibiza, Sant Antoni and Mahon have considerably improved this network.

However, it should be noted that the objectives of the 2006 Steering Plan have not been achieved effectively enough. In terms of regular interurban transport, the rigidity of the concession system has meant that the public authorities have little ability to change the model on all the islands, even though improvements have been made through new mechanisms – such as programme contracts – which have enabled regular bus transport to reach many spots on the islands. In the railway network, the effect of poor planning has led programmes whose strategic importance is acknowledged to be stalled – such as the streetcar in the Bay of Palma or the expansion of the network towards Alcúdia. Instead, the focus has curiously been on projects that were not included in this plan yet have very low profitability, such as the university underground, acknowledged in many spheres as one of the worst investments in railway infrastructures in all of Spain in recent years. Nonetheless, the railway network has gone from 30 km in length between Palma and Inca in 1985 to 80 km today with the extension to Manacor and Sa Pobla. It has also developed positively in qualitative terms, thanks to increased frequency. Furthermore, the electrification of the service to Manacor and Sa Pobla planned for 2017 entail yet another step towards more sustainable collective transport.

Two factors open up a window of opportunity in this sense: the revision of the Steering Plan via a new instrument included in the recent Law on Transports of the Balearic Islands, the Mobility Plan of the Balearic Islands, which will start in 2017, and the end of the regular road transport concessions in 2018, which will allow the concession model to be thoroughly revised and bring regular interurban transport up to the quality standards it deserves in view of the number of travellers it carries.

4. Looking ahead to the future

In his book on creative cities (Florida, 2009), Richard Florida developed the concept of "mega-regions" and sketches three on the Iberian Peninsula: Lisbon (the entire Atlantic coastline from Lisbon to El Ferrol), Madrid and its more extensive metropolitan area, and Barcelona-Lyon, which encompasses the entire Mediterranean axis from Algeciras to Marseille and Lyon. This latter is the eleventh most important mega-region in the world and the fifth in Europe after Amsterdam-Brussels-Antwerp, London-Leeds-Manchester, Milan-Turin and Frankfurt-Stuttgart, far above others like Paris (17th) or Madrid (38th). And one of the factors explaining this difference is precisely the Mediterranean connection to Europe, which has a very high potential for development if it gains ground as one of the gateways from the Asian countries.

Therefore, it is clear that the Mediterranean axis, and specifically the Valencia-Barcelona-France connection, has a development pattern that makes it one of the most dynamic in southern Europe. Recognising this, along with the historical ties between the Region of Valencia, Catalonia and the Balearic Islands, only reaffirms the obvious need for cooperation in order to strengthen these ties and take advantage of shared synergies.

By now, it is also obvious that cooperation on the Balearic Islands is closely tied to maritime (primarily) and air connections. Given the role of the ports of Valencia and Barcelona as the islands' suppliers, these connections will only get stronger in the future. Yet we must go even further: working together on the advances in airport-co-management; taking advantage of models in terms of the deployment and management of the railway network (the recent agreements between Railway Services of Mallorca and the Railways of the Government of Catalonia and with Railways of the Government of Valencia are good examples) and stressing key factors in the development of new mobility policies, such as technological innovation; focusing on systems working towards zero emissions, where electrical mobility will play a prime role; and coordinating territorial policy and mobility planning to work towards more sustainable mobility in all senses.

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Instagram: an Australian-Catalan telecollaboration experiment

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Abstract

This article explores the pedagogical potential of a project carried out with Catalan as a second language learners and native Catalan speakers using the digital application Instagram within a university setting. This project ran parallel to in-person language classes, and it combined photographs and written expression to make the learning process more enriching, direct and connected to the real world. The main objectives of this project were first to foster Catalan learners' interaction and contact with native speakers and thus improve their communicative competence, and secondly to introduce both groups to sociocultural aspects of the two cultures to help them more directly attain intercultural competence. The resulting data shed light on forms of remote interaction with native speakers as well as on the suitability of social media for collaborative activities within a university setting.

Key words: telecollaboration, online learning, Catalan as a second language, intercultural competence, interaction, Instagram.

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1. Introduction

The current deluge of digital applications has had a substantial impact on language teaching, making it possible to introduce new teaching practices that were unthinkable even in the recent past. An increasingly technological society in which we find out what is happening with our smartphones, and where paper is giving way to digital media at a breakneck speed, is forcing us to reconsider teaching and explore new educational possibilities to make the learning process more effective. In foreign language classrooms, more conventional practices have given way to more interactive ones with more real contact with the culture of the language being studied. One example is telecollaboration experiences based on Web 2.0 tools, which enable students to be in more direct contact with other cultures, as we shall outline in full detail below.

Using these digital tools in the language classroom makes even more sense within the context of teaching Catalan as a second language abroad as they help overcome the distances between the linguistic regions. Direct exposure to other cultures is precisely more difficult abroad, and this fact forces us to find alternative forms of contact to overcome these distances.

In this article, we shall provide a practical presentation of a specific telecollaboration project between Catalan learners and native Catalan speakers through the photography application Instagram to determine its pedagogical possibilities. First, we shall introduce the project's objectives and justify its importance according to the guidelines of the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR). Secondly, we shall provide a detailed description of the project and explain how it was carried out. Next, we shall examine several contributions from experts on second-language acquisition with Web 2.0 tools. Thirdly, we shall present the project's findings on the written output, interaction among the participants and attainment of intercultural competence, emphasising the aspects that worked the best while acknowledging the limitations and possibilities for improvement. Finally, we shall conclude the article with an overall assessment of the project by examining the data collected in the opinion survey. In this section, we shall also reflect on the suitability of this project within a university setting either inside or outside the field of languages.

2. Objectives of the project

The digital cultural exchange is a real classroom experience which has two facets: communicative and intercultural. The goal is for students to put their communicative skills into practice by exchanging short written texts while also addressing sociocultural issues which can help them understand aspects of the everyday lives of speakers from other cultures.

Therefore, we can say that the project's main objective is to help the participants attain communicative and intercultural competence while bearing in mind the limitations inherent to CEFR level A1 and the project design.

Within communicative competence, the goal is for the participants to practise a series of communicative functions determined by different contexts, as well as to foster interaction among them. In terms of intercultural competence, sociocultural aspects are examined according to CEFR's public domain of language use.

3. Justification

The European languages department at Monash University uses CEFR as its guideline. CEFR states that in order to participate satisfactorily in communicative situations, users and learners must draw from a series of competences learned in the course of their previous experience. For this reason, the project tries to equip students with the tools for declarative knowledge (knowledge of the world, sociocultural knowledge and sociocultural awareness), since second-language teaching often takes for granted that the learners have already acquired enough knowledge of world of the culture(s) of the language being studied, even though this is often not the case. Within general competences and declarative knowledge, CEFR establishes the following declarative knowledge:

Table 1. Declarative knowledge (CEFR)

1. General competences
 	
   1.1 Declarative knowledge
      1.1.1   Knowledge of the world
      1.1.2   Sociocultural knowledge
      1.1.3   Intercultural awareness

Elements like processes, events and geographic, environmental and demographic features, etc. (knowledge of the world), along with others related to everyday life, interpersonal relations, values, beliefs, social conventions and ritual behaviours (sociocultural knowledge) encompass the general competences that students of any language have to attain through experience and direct contact, or by other means, such as facilitative tasks that expose students to all these basic elements of language learning.

Below is a series of descriptors, according to the CEFR classification, of the different contexts of language use dealt with throughout the project, which help address a variety of sociocultural issues. These categories have served as the reference when developing the topics on which this project is based:

Table 2. External domains of language use. Descriptive categories

Areas	Places	Institutions	People	Objects	Events	Actions	Texts
Personal		The family and social relations	Parents, siblings, in-laws, close friends, acquaintances	Art objects, books Pets Sports and entertainment facilities	Family events, gatherings Holidays, outings Sporting events	Everyday actions Reading Radio and television Leisure activities Hobbies	

					Games and sports	
Public	Public spaces: streets, squares, parks Public transports Shops, markets, supermarkets Restaurants, bars, churches				Shopping and using public services Fun, leisure activities	Tickets
Occupational	Public establishments, department stores, shops					
Educational		Institutions		Exchanges Visits and exchanges	Games	

Source: Author

Digital cultural exchange exposes the participants to some of these elements, even if just in an introductory fashion, in addition to helping raise intercultural awareness of the cultures associated with the participants' languages. As CEFR says, "knowledge, awareness and understanding of the relation (similarities and distinctive differences) between the 'world of origin' and the 'world of the target community' produce an intercultural awareness" (2001, p. 103), which contributes to a better understanding not only of one's own culture but also of the regional and social diversity within each culture.

4. Description and contextualisation of the project

The participants in the Australian-Catalan telecollaboration project were the students enrolled in Introductory Catalan 1 (ATS2058) at Monash University on the one hand, and the Translation and Interpreting students at University Jaume I (UJI) and the Catalan Philology students at the University of the Balearic Islands (UIB) on the other. Both groups have a similar profile; they are all university students of similar ages with a particular interest in languages.

Every week, the participants had to post a photo or a video on a given topic on Instagram, along with a comment written in English or Catalan with a certain number of words. Instagram was chosen as a meeting point for the two groups because it is quite popular among young people and is user-friendly and not overly complicated. Generally speaking, young people are quite skilled at using the social media, and there Instagram is not very technically complicated.

The photographs and the comments were posted using a tag system which changed according to the weekly topic. This system enabled the participants to see each others' comments, as well as all the comments on the topics posted to date. The length of the comments for each photograph was between 35 and 40 words, not counting all the subsequent interactions that might arise among participants. The participants were assembled into four groups of six participants each who were supposed to interact with each other, even though they could also interact with other groups. The table below shows the tag system used in the first six weeks:

Table 3. System of tagging the posts

Weeks	Tags		
1 (3-9 March) Who are you?	#ICDMON #quietsmon #quietsmon1 #quietsmon4	#quietsmon2	#quietsmon3
2 (10-16 March) Hobbies	#ICDMON #aficionsmon #aficionsmon1 #aficionsmon4	#aficionsmon2	#aficionsmon3
3 (17-23 March) The people around you	#ICDMON #entornmon #entornmon1 #entornmon	#entornmon2	#entornmon3
4 (24-30 March) Your city	#ICDMON #ciutatmon #ciutatmon1 #ciutatmon4	#ciutatmon2	#ciutatmon3
5 (31 March – 6 April) Shops	#ICDMON #botiguesmon #botiguesmon1 #botiguesmon4	#botiguesmon2	#botiguesmon3
6 (7-13 April) Breakfast	#ICDMON #esmorzarmon #esmorzarmon1 #esmorzarmon4	#esmorzarmon2	#esmorzarmon3

Source: Author

This project was part of the Australian students' final evaluation, while it was totally voluntary for the students in Valencia and the Balearic Islands. In order to motivate the Catalan-speaking participants, it was decided that Monash University would award them a certificate of participation at the end of the project. Only those who completed all the tasks earned the certificate.

The main language of communication in the comments was Catalan, although English was also used. The students at Monash University always had to write in Catalan; however, since this was an exchange, the Catalan-speaking students were given the option of writing in either English or Catalan. The main goal was to learn about the everyday customs of the speakers from the other culture, and therefore the instructors did not correct the grammar in the posts, nor did the participants correct each other.

The reason why this project was presented to the students as a strictly cultural activity is because we wanted to prioritise communication and spontaneity as opposed to the accuracy and official rules so characteristic of conventional written production tasks. Therefore, more importance was attached to the exchange of ideas without external pressure to use correct grammar as a way to make the communication lighter, more fluid and more focused on the content. The topics each week were as follows:

Table 4. List of topics discussed in the project[1]

1. *Who are you?*
Briefly introduce yourself. Tell your name, where you're from, your age, what you study and what languages you speak. Include a greeting and a farewell. The photo can be of you or something you identify with.

2. *Hobbies*
Tell about a hobby of yours, whether you do it alone or with friends, how often, etc.

3. *The people around you*
This week you have to talk about someone else, such as a family member, friend, pet, etc. Tell what this person/animal is like.

4. *Your city*
Briefly describe your city and tell what you like the most about it. The photo can be of a place that you particularly like or is part of your daily routine.

5. *Shops*
Take a photo of a place you usually go shopping or an interesting shop that you like. Describe what it's like, what you can buy there, its hours, etc.

6. *What do you eat for breakfast?*
What do you eat or what do people usually eat for breakfast where you live? Is there any special or traditional dish? Do you drink coffee, tea, hot chocolate? Do you have breakfast at home or sometimes go to a café or restaurant?

7. *Your neighbourhood*
Describe your neighbourhood, what you can find there, a curious place or shop, where it's located, the kind of neighbourhood, houses, etc.

8. *How do you get around?*
Tell how you get around the city. What public transport do you use? Is there bike-sharing in your city? Are there any passes so you can save money? Do many people use them?

9. *Music*
Do you like music? Do you go to concerts? Do you buy music online or do you buy CDs? What singers or bands do you like?

10. *Holiday traditions*
Tell about a traditional celebration held in your city or country, what people do then, whether you participate and whether or not you like it.

11. *Traditional dishes*
What's your favourite dish? What are its ingredients? Do you know how to cook it? When is it eaten? Is it popular or traditional in your house?

12. *Your bar*
What's your favourite bar? What drinks or food do they make? What type of people go there? Why do you like it?

[1] The instructions were written in standard eastern Catalan, which is the model used in the classroom.

These topics were chosen in accordance with CEFR level A1 and following the order in which they appeared in the textbook (Veus 1) used in the in-person classes. Therefore, the students wrote their posts after they had received the input they needed (grammatical structures and vocabulary) to achieve the specific communicative objectives. Thus, if the topic of free-time activities was discussed in class in week 1, the students had to put these communicative linguistic contents into practice and comment on a photo of their choice in week 2.

The technical requirements needed to participate in the project were having a smartphone with Instagram installed on it. This app does not allow photographs or comments to be posted via a web browser, which did lead to several problems, as we shall explain below.

5. Theoretical framework

Different experts have written about the importance of integrating the social media in language learning today. Below we shall examine some of the contributions that address aspects related to the practice of telecollaboration.

5.1.   Definition and current use

Dooly (2008) defines telecollaboration as a teaching and learning experience shared among participants in institutional settings located in different places, facilitated by the use of Internet technology. Guth and Helm (2010, p. 14) define telecollaboration as follows:

> In language learning contexts, telecollaboration can be defined as an Internet-based intercultural exchange between people of different cultural/national backgrounds, set up in an institutional context with the aim of developing both language skills and intercultural communicative competence [...] through structured tasks.

Dooly's definition of telecollaboration dovetails with the initial plan of the Digital Cultural Project in that, as mentioned above, the main objective of this telecollaboration experience was to help improve the participants' communicative and intercultural competence. What is more, the two participating groups are from different educational settings and communicate via an online digital application.

In terms of the suitability of using digital tools in an educational setting, in an article on using blogs, wikis and social media, Araujo (2014) asserts that the tools provided by the advent of Web 2.0 are playing an increasingly important role in the teaching-learning process of any subject, given that a considerable number of students are digital natives, are familiar with the use of these tools and use them in different facets of their lives (personal, professional, social, etc.).

5.2.   Emotional factors of Web 2.0 tools

In a study on the use of Twitter in the foreign language classroom, Cuadros and Varo (2013) reached the conclusion that learning in informal settings, in which students feel no pressure from teachers or peers, helps build a personal learning

environment, strengthens the bonds between students and teachers and exposes the students to samples of real language.

Similarly, based on a collaborative online experience aimed at fostering lexical creativity, Bosch and Cruz (2014) state that asynchronous communication gives foreign students time to reflect, which helps them feel uninhibited when expressing themselves in Catalan. Furthermore, communication via Web 2.0 allows the limits of the in-person classroom to be overcome and thus multiplies the student-teacher and student-student communicative effect and makes the class more cohesive.

5.3.   *Intercultural competence*

In addition to the intercultural awareness that CEFR proposes, Byram (1997) had previously advocated a model of intercultural competence that consists in five components or kinds of knowledge (savoirs) which can be summarised as follows:

- Intercultural attitudes (savoir être): Curiosity and broad views, willingness not to discredit other cultures and belief in one's own.

- Knowledge (savoirs) of the social groups and practices of both one's own country and the interlocutor's country.

- Interpretation and relation skills (savoir comprendre): The ability to interpret and explain a document or event in another culture and to relate it to documents and events in one's own culture.

- Discovery and interaction skills (savoir apprendre/faire): The ability to acquire new knowledge and cultural aspects and to use this knowledge in communication.

- Critical cultural awareness (savoir s'engager): The ability to critically evaluate perspectives, practices and products of both one's own and other cultures based on explicit criteria.

5.4.   *Photography as a motivating element*

Another factor that should be borne in mind when analysing intercultural competence in telecollaboration projects is the motivating role of photography when showing a specific reality. In fact, visual components prompt verbal responses and have been used since the early 20th century to analyse personality with the famous Rorschach tests. In language teaching, images can be used at any level and are quite common in textbooks, especially in oral activities. Muller (2012) discusses photography not only as a tool for fostering communication in the language classroom but also for presenting deeper cultural contents in a given teaching sequence. Therefore, photography is also an important element facilitating the attainment of intercultural competence. Friesen (2012) recounts a real experience on including photography for a diverse student group in the English as a second language classroom and reaches the following conclusions:

> The classroom dynamics change when I combine artistic media with my pedagogy. Suddenly the otherwise quiet students speak up, enthusiastically participate, and feel comfortable in contributing to

class discussions and sharing their work.

In the case of the digital cultural exchange, the photographs that were more curious or unfamiliar to the participants drew their attention the most and inspired the most comments.

5.5.   Interaction

Digital cultural exchange is not merely a collection of comments and photographs on specific topics but also strives to create an ongoing dialogue among the two participating groups and thus foster interaction. In this sense, Licoppe (2009, p. 1925) talks about the interactive possibilities currently available to language learners thanks to the broad gamut of applications and other digital platforms:

> Members have resources to interact from a distance, through an ever more sophisticated array of communication technologies (and prominently mobile technologies), which has sparked the development of 'connected presence,' in which social relationships are accomplished through a seamless web of frequent face-to-face encounters and variously mediated interactions at a distance.

CEFR (2001) asserts that the student's or learner's communicative competence is put into practice in different language activities, including understanding, expression, interaction and mediation. It defines interaction as at least two individuals participating in an oral or written exchange in which expression and understanding alternate and may overlap in communication. One of the language learning competences introduced by CEFR is conversational competence, which is directly related to interaction:

> Conversational competence is not simply a matter of knowing which particular functions (microfunctions) are expressed by which language forms. Participants are engaged in an interaction, in which each initiative leads to a response and moves the interaction further on, according to its purpose, through a succession of stages from opening exchanges to its final conclusion. Competent speakers have an understanding of the process and skills in operating it.

While Instagram allows for interaction among users in order to produce messages related to given themes, it should also be borne in mind that the type of interaction produced via this channel (Instagram) differs significantly from spontaneous interaction in oral conversation. We could say that there is a certain degree of spontaneity in this project, but this kind of written interaction is usually more planned, especially among the Catalan learners who have to use the structures they are studying, and there is a prior reflection process in order to produce the message. In the previous section, we claimed that there are studies that show the potential of photography to motivate students in cultural aspects. Similarly, photography can also help foster interaction, as Muller (2012) says below:

Auteur photography, a fictional cultural object, can be used in the language class as a means to trigger interaction. The device that we put into practice allows learners to become deeply engaged in the task thanks to the communicative themes provided by the images.

6. Interpretation of results

Through a series of samples, we shall see how the participants interacted with each other, how they put different communicative functions into practice and whether they shared information on the external usage contexts.

Likewise, we shall also examine the survey that the students filled out once the project was over, which provides data on their attainment of intercultural competence.

Throughout the project, different kinds of interaction which helped put into practice the communicative functions at CEFR level A1 were observed. We have classified them as follows:

Table 5. Interaction among the participants

Type	Comments
Responding to an introduction	— Greetings: Hello, XXX! I hope this is a good opportunity to get to know people and new cultures, too. — Hello, XXX! Nice to meet you. I really like your hair. — Hello, XXX! Nice to meet you! — Hello, XXX! Welcome! — This is so much fun, seeing people interested in Catalan. Nice to meet you, XXX!
Asking for information	— What do you think is more difficult, Chinese or Catalan? — Why are you interested in learning Catalan? Hugs! — Hello, XXX. What is netball? — How are people treating it disrespectfully? — Lots of Australians like to surf, right? — What do they call it?
Answering specific questions	— Definitely Chinese. — Well, it's mainly a political issue. There's a hatred towards us Catalans, but in my opinion, it is political and baseless. As a Valencian, I have no problem calling it either Catalan or Valencian. — Netball is a sport like basketball, but you can't bounce the ball […] — OK, thanks for the explanation. I've never seen it before. Super interesting! — Yes, it's really popular in my city. — Oh, that's really interesting. Here in the Mediterranean, we don't have enough waves to do it. I think that in the south, in Andalusia, you can surf on some beaches.
General comments	— I really like your drawing, XXX! — Hello, XXX! I began to play the electric guitar a few years ago, but I got tired of it. It was really hard for me! — I like Harry Potter, too. — When I was a kid, I also used to go skiing with my aunt and uncle and I loved it, but I haven't gone for a long time. Hugs! — I also used to dance Flamenco! I loved it! — By the way, I also love Downton Abbey.

	— Hello, XXX! I also love to travel. I've travelled a lot with my parents and my brother, and sometimes alone or with friends. I've never been to New Zealand or Australia, but they must be amazing. Aren't you afraid to hitchhike?
	— Travelling is awesome!! :) But I think I'd also be a little intimidated to hitchhike!!
	— Ha ha, I was a bit afraid the first time. But I love adventures! And people are usually super-friendly. Once I was picked up by the man who made the Oscar-winning film 'The Pianist'. It was really exciting!
	— Awesome. I've also hitchhiked around Europe. I think it's the best way to meet interesting people who you wouldn't meet otherwise :)
	— I don't know… I don't think I'd do it. :S But it's interesting to read your experiences! Maybe it's more common to hitchhike in Australia than here?
	— I am glad to see people from foreign countries trying to learn our language. It was something I could never imagine because people from our own country treat it disrespectfully. Thank you so much for your effort and your interest.
	— I really love your dog, XXX!
	— I love your sister's name. I've never heard it before. I have a brother and we're also different in both our tastes and our personalities, but we don't fight too much.
	— Melbourne must be a beautiful city. Someday I'd like to visit Australia to see Sydney and Melbourne.
	— I think Melbourne is better than Sydney.
Expressing admiration or surprise	— It's beautiful!
	— It's so impressive! And the kangaroos, too!
	— What a beautiful landscape!
	— I love this photo! It's so soothing.
	— I've never met anyone who likes woodworking… that's really interesting!
	— How beautiful and peaceful it looks there!
	— Cool! That graffiti is amazing!
	— It looks like a really interesting city and there's always something to do there.
	— How beautiful!
	— Yeah, it does make you want to sit down there!
	— I love Manel! Especially his version of "La Gent Normal".
	— How beautiful!

Source: Author

Even though the instructions for the project made it clear that a certain degree of interaction among the groups was expected, there were posts that got no type of response or interaction with other users. For future editions of the project, we will study which topics garnered the most interest and consider introducing a moderator who can encourage the conversation among all the groups.

Observing the posts, we saw that the dialogue that emerged between the two groups of participants helped consolidate the structures studied in class and put the communicative functions at CEFR level A1 into practice. Therefore, the texts by the Catalan speakers served as both a reference and an exercise in written comprehension for the participants. This enabled new structures to be

introduced, as well as helping the non-native Catalan speakers deduce vocabulary related to the topics within a communicative context.

Below we shall see examples of several posts made in week 1, which show the students practising the basic structures needed to master the functions inherent in introductions, greetings and goodbyes:

Table 6. Written production. Week 1: Who are you?

Students from Monash	Students from the UJI and the UIB
Hello! *My name is* XXX, I'm 23 years old and *I'm Australian, from* Melbourne. *I speak English and Spanish, and I study* the Arts and Sciences. *Talk soon!* #ICDMONASH #Quietsmonash #Quietsmonash4	Hi everyone!! My name is XXX, I'm 19 years old and I'm from a tiny town in Valencia called XXX. I study Translation and Interpreting at the UJI. I know how to speak Catalan, Spanish, English and a bit of German and Portuguese. See you soon!! ;) #ICDMONASH #quietsmonash #quietsmonash4
Hi everyone! *My name is* XXX, *I'm Australian, from* Melbourne. *I'm* 23 and I study Environmental Engineering and Spanish at Monash University. *I speak* English, Spanish and now *a little* Catalan. *Bye!* #quietsmonash #ICDMONASH #quietsmonash2	Hi everyone! My name is XXX, although my friends call me XXX. I live in XXX, a beautiful little town on Mallorca. Right now, I'm in my first year of a Bachelor's in Catalan Language and Literature at the UIB. I can speak Catalan, Spanish, English and French, although I've also studied Latin and classical Greek. I hope we have lots of fun in this digital exchange. Kisses to everyone: my personal Instagram is XXX #ICDMONASH #quietsmonash #quietsmonash2 #intercanvidigital
Hello! How's it going? My name is XXX. *I'm from* Melbourne, Australia, and *I'm* 22 *years old. I study* Physiology at Monash and *I speak* Spanish. *Bye!* #ICDMONASH #Quietsmonash #Quietsmonash3	Hi everyone! My name is XXX, I'm 21 years old and I'm from XXX, a town in Valencia. I study Translation and Interpreting at the University Jaume I. I speak Catalan, Spanish, English and French. See you soon! #ICDMONASH #quietsmonash #quietsmonash1
Hello Catalan friends! *My name is* XXX, *I'm* twenty years old and I live in Melbourne, one of the largest cities in Australia. In addition to *languages*, I also *study* Law and Politics. Currently I speak English and Spanish, and a bit of German and Catalan. In the summer, I travelled to Sidney, another major city, and I played music with friends. I hope to learn more about you soon! *Bye*	Hello! I'm XXX and I'm 20 years old. I live in XXX, a tiny village in Valencia, and I study Translation and Interpreting in Castellón. I speak Catalan, Spanish and English, and a bit of German. I hope we all really enjoy this experience. Bye and talk next week. #ICDmonash #quietsmonash #quietsmonash1 #projecte #intercanvi #Austràlia
Hi! My name is XXX. *I'm from New Zealand* but I live in Australia. I'm 22 *years old*. I'm studying Spanish at Monash University. I speak English (very well), Spanish (well) and Catalan and Portuguese (*just a bit*). *Talk soon!* #ICDMONASH #Quietsmonash #Quietsmonash2	Hello! Greetings to everyone! I'm XXX, I'm 19 and I live in XXX, Castellón. I study Translation and Interpreting at the UJI, and as you see I speak Catalan, Spanish, English and French, and I have a basic level of German. So, you could say that I really love languages. I hope to hear from you soon! Hugs! #ICDMONASH #quietsmonash #quietsmonash4

Source: Author

We cannot empirically assess whether the project helped the participants attain a higher level of intercultural competence, since this reflects each student's

personal motivations and degree of engagement. Furthermore, the contents of this project were limited in order to adapt to the Catalan learners' level and the length of the Australian university semester. However, at the end of the project, the students were given a survey in which they were able to share their opinions on the project and directly assess whether it had helped them better understand the culture of the language they were studying. Question 2 in the table below shows their answers:

Table 7. General feedback on the digital cultural exchange

1. I found the digital exchange:	
An enriching experience	67%
Yet another language assignment	33%
Not at all useful	0%
2. This experience helped me to:	
Better understand the culture of Valencia/the Balearic Islands	33%
Learn more about the lifestyle of people from the other culture	100%
Reflect on my culture	17%
Break stereotypes	17%
3. What do you think about using the new technologies in the foreign language classroom?	
They're a useful way to be in touch with native speakers	83%
The teaching is more dynamic	67%
It connects the lessons with the real world in a more direct way	67%
It can be confusing at times	0%
I prefer traditional language teaching	33%
4. This project helped me in my language proficiency:	
Totally agree	0%
Agree	100%
Disagree	0%
Totally disagree	0%

Source: Author

Based on the data in the survey, we can see that the majority (67%) of the participants believe that the digital cultural exchange helped them learn more about the lifestyle of people from other cultures, yet only some of the students (33%) believe that it helped them better understand Catalan and/or Australian culture.

In addition to the closed-ended questions, the students were also able to express their opinions on the project in general or on other aspects:

- *I thought the Instagram cultural exchange was a brilliant idea, and a really good way to practise basic sentences and learn new words in another language. It's also fun to see what life is like for students across the side of the world.*

- *It was an innovative and fun way to get us to practice much more often, I really enjoyed it.*

- *It was enjoyable talking with non-English speakers.*

- *Not all students have smartphones.*

7. Limitations

This project has the limitations inherent to CEFR level A1, since intercultural competence cannot be achieved with just a brief introduction to certain cultural facts. Higher linguistic complexity is needed to be able to express oneself on more abstract issues. Another limitation is related to technology, as there was one student who did not have a smartphone and was unable to participate in the project. This student was asked to send comments on the weekly topics by email, but he was unable to interact with the other participants. Another technical glitch was the way Instagram works, since some participants had problems with their smartphones and had to drop out of the project. Instagram does not allow photographs to be uploaded from its website but instead only allows users to see pictures posted from a mobile phone. For future editions of this project, other platforms which can also be used from a browser, like Pinterest, Tumblr or Flickr, will be considered.

Another problem was the linguistic accuracy of the posts, not those by the learners – it is natural for them to make mistakes in their learning process – but in the posts by the native speakers, who in theory should serve as a reference in the Catalan language model. Furthermore, some of the native participants did not adapt their discourse to a language level that was accessible to the learners.

In terms of the way the project worked, we can state that only the Catalan learners benefitted linguistically; because Catalan was the working language used in the project, the native speakers from Valencia and the Balearic Islands acted more as linguistic coaches.

8. Conclusions

Throughout this article, we have showcased the pedagogical possibilities of a digital cultural exchange from two different perspectives: culture and communicative. The tasks done throughout the project helped the students in both participating groups learn about sociocultural aspects of other linguistic areas and consolidate the linguistic contents of Catalan – only for the students at Monash University – through weekly practice. Indeed, according to the survey, the majority of participants (67%) believe that the digital cultural exchange helped them learn more about the lifestyle of people from other cultures, and all of them (100%) said that it helped them progress in their language learning.

This study made it possible to reflect on forms of remote interaction with native speakers, and especially on the suitability of the social media Instagram for collaborative activities in the university setting. Furthermore, within the

educational context of the Catalan language class, this project helped strengthen the bonds among students, in addition to providing them contact with samples of real language.

In terms of communication, it helped the students put communicative functions at the CEFR A1 level into practice and master the language structures they had studied throughout the course by posting weekly comments.

We can also say that this experience has been a motivating factor in the students' learning process, and we believe that it could have different applications in other educational settings both inside and outside the Catalan language domain. Today's digital platforms can serve as channels of connection not only among native speakers of a language and its learners but also among groups of learners from different places with similar objectives. The potential of these applications in language teaching is unlimited and can be used according to the needs of the course and the educational setting in which it is being offered.

We can currently find literature on occasional telecollaboration experiences via different social media or other more conventional media, such as email, discussion forums, chats and videoconferencing. However, researchers have not sufficiently analysed a single platform to provide a more well-grounded picture of its suitability for tasks related to language learning. In fact, Cassany (2011) states that the social media can play an important role in learning processes, but that having them play a prominent role in formal education seems more complicated.

In this sense, we believe that much research remains to be done in order to examine the different aspects associated with telecollaboration experiences in the second language classroom, such as the evaluation of non-linguistic contents, the choice of topics, correct spelling and grammar among the participants and the curricular framing of digital activities. In short, we are equipped with new digital communication tools which overcome not only physical but also cultural distances and can have major repercussions on the way we currently envision language teaching and learning.

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